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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
When James Joyce's Ulvsses was first published, many people viewed it as a
complete chaos. Since then, the attempts to understandUlvsses have spawned a critical
industry that could quite possibly be viewed as being at least as chaotic as Ulvsses would
seem to be. In this post-modem era, then, any attempt to understand Ulvsses (or any other
text, for that matter) and discuss it within the professional field demands at least a minimal
familiarity with this critical body's ocean of ideas.
This thesis is obviously no exception. One such idea in this ocean has to be love in
Ulvsses. And that is the idea with which this thesis concerns itself. The definition of love in
Ulvsses has been more or less taken for granted as a settled issue despite the fact that
conflicting interpretations of love in Ulvsses continue to circulate in Joycean essays. This
study maintains that the best way to understand love in Ulvsses is through a reader-
response/structuralist method rather than a strictly formalist method, a method which can be
defined as an "analyses generated by the assumption that meaning is embedded in the
artifact" (Fish 1241). As a result of using this reader-response method, we can see how love
in Ulvsses doesn't have any one conclusive meaning; rather, Joyce challenges us to examine
love in all its multiplicity and uncertainty, to come to our own reflections concerning love by
using Ulvsses as a touchstone.
But to understand why this study ought to be conducted, we must understand the
claims and needs of the critical industry in which it is attempting to situate itself.
Fortunately, in its journey through this treacherous ocean that has laid waste to many a
formidable critical ship, this thesis, unlike the hero Ulysses, has recourse to at least two
reliable guides: Bernard Benstock andJeffrey Segall. Though I hope that I'havenot
slavishly replicated their opinions and assessments ofvarious criticisms, I found that my own
)
literature review resembled theirs both in form and content, and felt that it could benefit from
a fuller appropriation of theviews of these twocritics. More specifically, I found Benstock^s
1985Introduction to CriticalEssays on JamesJoyceparticularly helpful in its divisionof
Joycean criticism intothe four chronological eras of "Early Assessments," "Coterie and
Pioneers," "Mainstre^," and "Nouvelles Critiques." Segall's 1993 Joyce in America:
Cultural Politics and the Trials of Ulvsses became an asset when I was formulating my brief
overviews of each critics' assessment of Ulvsses. especially since, as Benstock
acknowledges, the Americans of the "late 1940s and early 1950s ... were the first true
Joyceans" (8). Benstock and Segall, then, served as convenient guides in deciding which
Joycean critics best represent the most influential viewpoints in the history of Joyce Criticism
regarding Ulvsses.
Through the initial critical reactions to Ulysses as presented by Benstock and Segall,
we can see that these early reactions seem to have set the precedent for all other readings
since: intense and radical disagreement. Segall calls these reactions a type of "cultural
warfare" (19); Benstock somewhat lightly calls them '^uneven" (3). For instance, whereas
Richard Aldington and Wyndham Lewis saw in Ulysses an overriding chaos, T. S. Eliot saw
an order striving amidst the modem world's chaos. As Segall points out, Eliot "argued that
the Homeric parallels in Ulvsses gave a shape and structure to the disorder of contemporary
life" (143). In another view ofUlvsses, Jung seems to combine these two contradictions in
himself. While he sees Ulvsses in one way as being a meaningless chaos, he also sees in it
the humanist abiUty to persevere andestabhsh meaning within the chaos: "Bloom...
experiences in thedirtsomething that had never happened tohim before: his own
transfiguration" (Benstock 1989 p.23). So,while these critics viewed a senseof orderin
Ulvsses. they still understood Ulvsses as being more a representation of chaosratherthanof a
meaningful human existence.
Unlike these earlycritics, latercritics viewed Ulvsses as primarily a humanist project.
In defininghumanism, I find JonathanDollimore's assessment of humanism's main
characteristics to be particularly useful: "If [man] is to be redeemed at all he must redeem
himself.... If... sufferingis to be justified at all it is becauseof what it reveals aboutman's
intrinsic nature —his courage and integrity" (189). To educate other readers about Joyce's
methods and purpose in constructing this humanist vision, severalcritics and friends of Joyce
began writing rather long explications offering overviews of the Joyce's entire work, or of
just Ulvsses. Among these critics and friends were Stuart Gilbert and Frank Budgen.
Of these two humanist critics, Stuart Gilbert offers the most significant formalist
defense of Ulvsses. In a detailed format following the Homeric findings of Eliot, Gilbert lays
out how Ulvsses is not at all a formless chaos, but carefully structured after Homer's Ulvsses
(Benstock 7). Joyce does not slavishly follow Homer, of course, but creates parallels at key
points. As Gilbert points out, Joyce's careful use of form moves beyond his parallel to
Homer; this formalism influences the smallest aspect ofUlvsses. To illustrate, Gilbert
carefully chooses several small examples which on the surface seem meaningless when
reading the book, or incredibly pointless, but nevertheless show how Joyce uses a formal
aesthetic. Thus, Gilbert disproves the charges that Ulvsses is a formless mess, and shows
Joyce to be oneof themost careful artists known, easily ascareful aswas Homer, or Shelley,
or Dickens.
Budgen, while discussing Ulvsses itself, was more interested in presenting Joyce as an
accessible, human figure, rather than the rnyopic obscurantist whichmany saw himto be. In
doing so, Budgen hopes to make Joyce more accessible to readers who may have been
intimidated by his difficult writing (Benstock8). He also shows how Joyce is riotso much
interested in anatomizing a meaningless chaos of physical forces as in portraying a difficult
universe in which good and bad freely mix. For Budgen, then, the point of Ulvsses is not the
exposition of a wasteland (as it was for Lewis, Jung, and Eliot) but the exposition of a multi-
faceted world in which good humans struggle to persevere amidst antagonistic obstacles such
as hatred and other anti-humanist forces (Budgen 73).
These humanist critical leanings gained strength and continued through the 1950's.
As Benstock points out, this new era of the "first true Joyceans ... who encouraged their
students to read and write about Joyce" was mostly driven by Richard M. Kain's Fabulous
Vovaeer.W.Y. Tindall's A Reader's Guide to James Jovce. and Richard Ellmann's James
Joyce. Like Budgen, these critics, too, sought to justify Joyce's Ulvsses to the world at large
by viewing his characters and work in a "positive" light. Consequently, Joyce, for them,
displays "humanity and philosophy" in his attempt to respond to the "monumental changes ..
. [of] the twentieth century"(Benstock 9). The chaotic Ulvsses of Aldington had thus passed
through the order-within-chaos Ulvsses of Jung and Eliot, and had given way to the Ulvsses
of "a cosmic vision, an embracing of all mankind" (Benstock 9).
The opposition to this movement can befound inHugh Kenner's Dublin's Joyce,
which some saw, according to Benstock as, "achilling antidote to ... critical pollyannaism
(Benstock 10). In Kenner's Ulysses, aswith the "positive critics," there is also a center and a
meaning, butthis center and meaning are beyond the grasp of any person in the modem
world. Themodem world's fragmentation prevents thecharacters ofUlysses from achieving
any sortof enlightenment or purpose. Rather, they are left stunted, failures, human-wanna
be's living hollow lives: the walking dead (Segall 148).
And as a corrective criticism to both Kenner's anti-sentimentalism and the humanists'
optimism came theCatholic critics. Works such asKevin Sullivan's Joyce Among the
Jesuits, William T. Noon's Joyce and Aquinas, and L.A.G. Strong's The Sacred River remind
us thatJoyce had grown upCatholic. This Catholic heritage, they claimed, shown through
Joyce's work (Benstock 162), and, in fact, revealed thathis religious sensibility informed his
work as well (Segall 162). Though Segall himself is suspicious of these attemptsas being a
"literary reclamation project" (160) runbyCatholics for Catholics, he does admitthat this
criticism "affirms at the very least that a moral sensibility and moral vision underlie Joyce's
work" (Segall 167).
But with the 1970's, Joyce criticism, influencedby French literary theory, takes a turn.
Through theworks of critics such as Robert Scholes (especially his "Ulysses; A Structuralist
Perspective"), JacquesDerrida,ThomasStaley,Jean Kimball and SuzetteHenke, Joyce
becomes more than an author of either nihilist chaos, humanist order, or Catholicism.
Instead, Joyce's work manifests various power structures, feminist ideals, psychological
constructs, Marxist politics, and structuralforms, as well as (or perhaps replacing) the
Modernist, Biographical, andCatholic tendencies seen by previous critics. Though the
humanist/Catholic claims survive in critical works such as Robert Boyle's James Jovce's
Pauline Vision: A Catholic Exposition, the explanation of what Joyce's work does has taken
on whole new meanings not before considered, or perhaps even thought fallacious.
Obviously, with such a great diversity in critical views concerning the meaning and
purpose of Ulvsses (indeed, if there is a meaning andpurpose at all), there could only be just
as great a difference, if not greater, in more specific considerations of the book. One specific
issue is love in Ulvsses. Certainly, this issue demands attention since so many of the
characters of Ulvsses are concerned with it: Bloom and Molly; Molly and Boylan; Mr and
Mrs. Purefoy; a mother and her child; a father and his child; Stephen and his mother;
Stephen and his father; Mulligan and his aunt; Stephen and his sister; Gerty and her secret
lover; the citizen and his country. The list goes on and on and on.
Aldington, Lewis, Eliot, and Jung do not seem very concerned with love as an issue
in itself; they are more concerned with whether the book offers a vision of chaos or some
general humanist vision. Presumably, though, if the humanist vision does exist, then love
would have to be a part of it. Nevertheless, none of these critics deal with love in particular,
despite the fact that the three main characters seem to be very much preoccupied with it.
For Gilbert and Budgen, Joyce's methods and other issues seem to be of greater
importance. Gilbert himself says nothing on the issue of love, whereas Budgen only makes
a passing reference when he claims, "Of mother love not much is said. To father love is
ascribed a significance rarely admitted" (73). He mentions love again when discussing his
humanist vision of community, claiming "excessive individualism" as the sin against
"brotherly love" (215). But, aswith motherly love, he fails to describe this brotherly love as it
exists in the world of Ulvsses.
Still, it is possible that this humanistJoyce is responsible for the discussion of love
which popped up at times during the 1950's. In his own corrective vision of thehumanist
Joyce, Hugh Kenner sees Bloom as having "all the natural virtues [including charity] in some
sort of laudablebalance" (189). Yet he viewsBloom's definition of love as "feeble," and
more fit for nursery rhymes than serious consideration (255). From this information, Kenner
dismisses the "sentimental" notion of Bloom as Messiah, and thus, presumably, of Bloom as
preacher of love (256). Seemingly, then, Kenner's visionof Ulvsses as the land of the dead
leaves no room for love.
Tillyard andEllmann, however, come to muchdifferent conclusions regarding, love in
Ulvsses. Tillyard believes that Joyce "condemns pride... and commends charity, the greatest
of virtues, [thus demonstrating] love's triumph" (125). Tillyard feels this so strongly that he
claims charity to be "the radiance of this great whole Fof Ulvssesi" (134). Not surprisingly,
then, Tillyard takes quite an opposite view to Kenner's in regarding Bloom's words in Barney
Kieman's: "Nowhere else in Ulvsses is its moral theme more explicit or more evident. The
conflict in Barney Kieman's is the conflict of hate with love, of inhumanity with humanity,
and of compassion with indifference or malice. In his capacity of Elijah, Jesus, and God,
Bloom embodies and defends all that is opposite his surroundings" (134). Yet, Tillyard
himself does little more than Bloom (or Kenner, for that matter) in the way of explicating
what love is in Ulvsses.
In a seeming echoof Tillyard, Ellmann, too, concludes in his biography James Joyce
that the ultimate vision of Ulvsses is one of love. Ellmann goes farther than Tillyard or other
previouscritics, though, in that he actually tries to give a general idea of what love is in
Ulvsses. For Ellmann, love is agape, a selfless giving of oneself to another. Ellmann
develops this viewfurther in Ulvsses on theLiffev. butmostparticularly in his preface to the
1984Gabler edition of Ulvsses. He claims that Joyce attempts to show us love in Ulvsses by
contrasting it with what is commonly mistaken for love: sentimentality, hate, and beastly
brutality. Unfortunately, Ellmann doesn't proceedmuch further; except for providing a few
examples concerning Gerty McDowell and Blazes Boylan, Ellmann doesn't expand his
discussion of love to a broader consideration of the rest of Ulvsses. He seems content to let
his claim that love is the word known to all men stand for itself (xiii).
As for the Catholic critics, they don't discuss the actual form of love iii Ulvsses until
Boyle's 1972 "Miracle in Black Ink: A Glance at Joyce's Use of his Eucharistic Image."
During a brief aside in this article, Boyle mentions that the best word to describe the
Eucharist is "love" (in Benstock 142). From there, he goes on to clarify the role of love in
Ulvsses by contrasting his understanding of the issue with Richard Ellmann's. Whereas
Ellmann claims love as the word known to all men, Boyle claims that love can't be the word
known to all men since it "does exclude a great deal — all negative, perhaps, but profoundly
operative nevertheless," and that Joyce "is unwilling to exclude the opposite of love in his
coal-hole vision" (in Benstock 143). Instead of proposing love as the word, Boyle proposes
"Shantih," or "Awmawn" (in Benstock 143). Where Ellmann sees Joyce's refusal to name
love in the later sections of Ulvsses as an attempt to avoid didacticism, then, Boyle sees
Joyce's denial of love asbeing theword known to allmen.
The debate aboutwhat love is (or is not) inUlvsses continued on its indirect track into
the 1980's. In her 1980 essay "Theosophy, Guilt, and 'That Word Known toAll Men' in
Joyce's Ulvsses." Cheryl T. Herr decides that love is only an aspect ofaword which reflected
various theosophical ideas, not the word itself (45). But this love, again, is a positive agape-
oriented motherly love that may at times beregarded by Stephen with "discomfort" (51).
This debate about the nature of the word (and, therefore, the way love would be
approached inthe book) took adecided turn in 1984 with the release of the Gabler edition of
Ulvsses. In this edition, the debate about "whatis theword known to all men" appeared to be
settled with the restoration of what has come to be known as the "love passage" in Scylla and
Charybdis. Inthis passage, Stephen wonders about the word known toall men and violently
mocks himself, asking himself if he even knows what he is talking about in themost basic
sense despite all hispretensions to genius: "Do youknow what you are talking about? Love,
yes.Wordknown to all men. Amor vero aliquidalicuibonum vult unde et ea quae
concupiscimus" (U 9.429 — U 9.431).
Quite predictably, Ellmann wasvery happy about thisdevelopment; Kenner, on the
other hand, was rather silent (Kimball 143). But Ellmann makes an important decision in his
reading of this fragment: it becomes clear that, though hemaybe convinced that love is the
word known to all men, what that word exactlymeans in Ulvsses remains to be articulated.
As Kimball points out, Ellmann's interpretation of the fragment as "thedefinitionof Aquinas
...: "Love truly wishes some good to another and therefore all desire it,' [depends upon '
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viewing thequote constructed byStephen as] a complete sentence [rather than as the
fragment as it ispunctuated inUlysses] and, with the expanded translation of 'concupiscimus'
as 'weall desire it,' giving it a universal application to harmonize with the 'word known to all
men'" (145). Kimball thusclaims thatEllmann, in doing so, fails to recognize theways in
whichStephen appropriates these words fromAquinas.
In her own 1987 "Love and Death in Ulvsses: 'Word known to all men,"' Jean
Kimball asserts thatStephen, ratherthan merely quoting Aquinas asEllmann claimed,
instead twists the fragments of one of Aquinas' definitions of love (SummaContraGentiles
1.91 quotedin Kimball 146) so that they looklikeoneof Aristotle's definitions of love. This
twisting thusproblematizes our understanding of what love is in Ulvsses rather than settling
it.
Kimball explains that, in his definitionof love, Stephen thinks to himself, "Amor vero
aliquid alicui bonum vult unde et eaquae concupiscumus ..." (U 9.430-31,ellipsis in text).
To construct this phrase, she, like Gifford and Seidman, recognizes that Stephen quotes
Aquinas as follows: Stephen's choice of words in bold caps:
' Per hoc enim quod intelligimus vel gaudemus, ad aliquod objectum aliqualiter nos
habere oportet; AMOR VERO ALIQUID ALICUI VULT; hoc enim amare
dicimur, cui aliquod BONUM volumus secundum modum praedictum; UNDE ET
EA QUAE CONCUPISCIMUS, simplicter quidem et proprie desidare dicimur, non
autem amare, sed potius nos ipsos, quibus ea concupscimus; et ex hoc ipsa per
accidens, non proprie dicimur amare. (Ex Officina Libraria MARIETTI [1820,1927],
p. 82, qutd. in Gifford and Seidman 221)
In explaining how Stephen appropriates this quote, Kimball claims, "Stephen ...
excerpts bonum from [Aquinas] and adds it to the first part of his quotation, turning it into
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Aristotle's definition of love or friendship — "love wills something good to someone" — ...
[from] the Ethics" (Kimball 146). The second p^ of Stephen's quotation
'Unde et ea quae concupiscimus [Hence those things which we want]' — ... is left
unfinished, and thus ambiguous. Stephentakesjust enough text from this sectionof
the Summa Contra Gentiles to include the secondary sense of love as well as the
primary sense which his first proposition, as amended, states. (Kimball 147)
Having distinguished Stephen's definition from the section of Aquinas' text in
question, Kimball discusses how this particular section of Aquinas' text is busy discussing
the primacy of love for people over love for non-human things, rather than, as Ellmann
clairhs, defining love as a matter of self-giving . And these two different definitions of love
aren't really in competition; they are merely degrees of proper and improper love (146). But,
as Kimball points out, "the distinction is more rhetorical than judgmental, a matter of what
one can properly call love, as defined by Aristotle, rather than a contrast between a true love
and love of self (147). In fact, as she goes on to point out, both Aristotle and Aquinas saw a
true love of self as a legitimate part of love for others (147).
With this argument in mind, Kimball then discusses how the word known to all men
is not a choice between Ellmann's love and Kenner's death, but a combination: the word is
"'love' and 'death'" (152). For Kimball, though, this love must have "a tie to the flesh;" it
must be embodied in a fleshly body, not some esoteric spirituahst fantasy. Yet it is this
enfleshed love which may conquer death, thus eliminating one half of the possibilities which
Kimball presents as the Word Known to All Men.
And John Gordon in his 1990, "Love in Bloom, by Stephen Dedalus," doesn't seem
much affected by this discussion at all. He's content with examining how love is the word
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known to all men, seemingly implicitly defining it as "the confirmation of shared truths"
(242). In this case, the shared truth is love, an agape-type love to be exact (248).
This discussion continued when Cheryl Fox wrote her 1993 essay "Absolutely:
Redefining theWord Known toAllMen." Here Foxclaims that theword couldn't be love
because of its "imprecision," its ability to "entail thesubjugation andtherefore thepartial
negation of the one loved." Fox sees these abilities of love to both affirm andnegate as
"mutually exclusive" and irreconcilable (800). Thus, sheclaims, thewordis neither "love"
nor "death," but "yes" which grants the affirmation which all of us seek (804). In doing so,
though, she fails to make Kimball's assessment thatwhatThomas' competing definitions of
love do is make a distinction between love of people vs. love of things; she maintains that the
distinction is between Thomistic agape and narcissism. But by discussing the "negating
aspects of love," Fox offers a nuance to love which Ellmann, Boyle, and Kenner had not
thought ofj and which Kimball had touched on: love isn't just all positive; it is negative as
well.
Through these expositions, then, we can see that the debate about what love
represents in Ulysses is still very much alive. Whereas the meaning of love is taken for
granted very much by previous critics (even by Ellmann) as only being the Thomistic agape,
Kimball and Fox raise the question of whether or not love can be more than that, can be
positive as well as negative. As both Kimball and Fox point out, this quote of Aquinas never
settles what love is; it merely raises two competing definitions, serves as a "'key,' [which] like
so many other keys to meaning in Ulvsses. appears to unlock a door that in turn leads to other
doors rather than to some treasure house of guaranteed meaning" (Kimball 147). Perhaps
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then, the desire to understand love as it is in itself in Ulysses, rather than as a peripheral
question to some other issue such as the wordknown to all men, would grasp theminds of
Joyce scholars in a way that it wouldn't have before the Gabler edition.
For the most part, though, love in these essays is not discussed as an issue in itself.
Rather than directly addressing the shape of love itself, love usually is discussed only as the
word known to all men. Rarely is it asked, "What is love itself in Ulvsses regardless of
whether or not it is the word known to all men?" The contribution of this essay is to do just
that: to investigate love in Ulvsses as love in Ulvsses. not as a peripheral concern to some
other issue such as the word known to all men or the general meaning of the book, though
these two issues certainly touch on and inform our understanding of love in Ulvsses.
In fulfilling the purpose of this essay to explore love in Ulvsses. three main points
demand attention: the epistemology of UlVsses. love as a material/nonmaterial phenomenon,
and love as a positive/negative phenomenon. The second chapter discusses how our
epistemological assumptions dictate the way in which we understand love in Ulvsses. If we
think that knowledge functions strictly linearly, working towards one final answer, we will be
inclined to think that Ulvsses offers one definition of love. But if love in Ulvsses doesn't
function in such a conclusive way, if it resists a conclusive definition, then we are missing
Joyce's point. Epistemologically, then, this thesis posits a recursive construction of
knowledge in Ulvsses which allows for multiple possible definitions of love, no one
definition receiving priority over the others.
Within this epistemological parameter, chapter three discusses love as a
material/nonmaterial phenomenon. Here three possible definitions of love are considered.
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First, love is considered as a strictly nonmaterial phenomenon. Second, love is considered as
a strictly material phenomenon. Andthen love is considered as a combination of the
nonmaterial and the material. Once all three definitions of love are seen as equally viable, I
discuss this formalist indeterminacy in terms of being a sign in itself, rather than as an
indeteiTOinacy to be resolved.
The fourth chapterfollows much the same format as the third. In this case, however,
two definitions of love are considered. First, love is considered as a strictly positive
phenomenon, something which in noway involves anything harmful. Second, love is
considered as an ambiguous reality, constituted bybothpositive andnegative realities. In
other words, love can involve harminganotherperson as well doing good for them. As in the
third chapter, once these equally viable formalist/structuralist readings aredemonstrated to be
mutuallyexclusive,I take this indeterminacy as anotheropportunity for a reader's sign-
making rather than as a problem to be solvedby a more thoroughformalist explication.
Finally, in my conclusion, I offer somegeneralobservations concerning possible
consequences of this study.
In examining these various possible definitions of love in Ulvsses. as Fve alluded to
before, I will be using a reader-responsemethod rooted in structuralist principles which seek
out type and categories (in this case, obviously, categories of love, and characters who act as
types, exemplifying various definitions of love). Though the two methods would seem
mutually exclusive (reader-response seeking meaning in the reader's process of reading,
structuralism seeking meaning in the book itself), Jane Tompkins points out that they can in
fact go hand in hand, structuralism being one of the "theoretical orientations" which "shape
15
[the] definitions of thereader, or interpretations, and of the text" (ix) asused by reader-
response theory. In other words, what kind ofreaders are we analyzing, what structures are
they forming, and what method do they use toform these structures which are then read by
reader-response analysts as signs? This thesis, therefore, posits a reader who forms readings
through structuralist methods. And it is these structuralist readings which I will explore from
the perspective of reader-response methodology.
Of course, thequestion must beasked concerning what kind of reader-response theory
this thesis will be using. As JaneTompkins points out,Jonathan Culler, for example, focuses
on the institutions which would teach readers the various forms applied in reading and
responding to literature (xviii). For another example, Wolfgang Iserwould maintain,
according to Tompkins, that, though weuse literature to improve ourselves morally, "the
ultimate objectof attention is the literary text" (xvi). Tompkins indicates that the aversion to
viewing literature as anobject external to thereader makes itsmost extreme shift, though, in
the work of Stanley Fish, wherein"the reader's activity is declaredto be identicalwith the
text and therefore becomes itself the source of all literary value. If literature is what happens
when we read, its value depends on the value of the reading process" (xvi).
I fmd all of the above critics useful, but I find Fish's "Interpreting the Variorum" the
most useful. For while I may still believe in an object to which we respond, I'm more
interested in the process of reading in which the reader engages. Ultimately, I'm more
interested in talking about the structures of the reader's response and what they mean, how
those responses themselves are created in a joint-venture between us and the work. Rather
than fully explaining this method now, though, thus testing the reader's memory, this thesis
16
will offera full explication ofFish's method in chapter two, thus demonstrating the
appropriateness ofreader-response for reading love in Ulvsses. This way, the method (atype
of epistemology in itself) will be closely situated neartheexplication ofUlvsses'
epistemology. Thus, before we come tothose wandering post-structuralist rocks ofreader-
response, wemust first pass through theIthaca of epistemology and understand the
importance of methodological self-consciousness.
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CHAPTER 2. GENERAL EPISTEMOLOGY OFULYS^
In coming to understand love inUlvsses, it's important thatwe learnhowwecometo
understand anything in Ulvsses. Asmany readers haveindicated, understanding Ulvsses, just
trying to read it at all, is an immense challenge. And since Ulvsses challenges ourusual
methods of developing a simpleaccount of story, it would seemthatUlvsses on a deeper
level challenges the common conclusions thatweusually reach basedon theseusual
methods. In other words, what is the model of knowing which Ulvsses itself presents to us,
and, moreimportantly, howdoes thismodel influence the way weunderstand love?
In the practice of many critics of love inUlvsses. knowledge occurs in a linearway (a
line froma starting point to a finishing point), resulting in conclusive knowledge, though this
knowledge is only gained after a harrowing joumey through themany obstacles, the many
wandering rocks, which Ulvsses tosses at the reader. This type of knowledge doesn't seem
appropriate for a bookwhich is structured recursively, which "startswith an S andendswith
an S, starts with techniques of narrative, Catechism, and monologue and ends with them
repeated in order in the Nostos. Like the world, the bookhas *no ends really because it's
round'" [U 378.30-1] (Thomas 86). My account of knowledge in Ulvsses, therefore, goes
contrary to the above notion of linear knowledge, and attempts to be more in tune with this
recursive structure of Ulvsses. In Ulvsses. knowledge, rather than moving in a straight line
from beginning to end and stopping, moves recursively, in a spiraling way: we begin
somewhere, proceed through induction and deduction and back again, constantly
reformulating definitions. Instead of conclusions, then, we are left with various possibilities
which result from "[t]hat language, as part of a language system without beginning or end.
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[which] allows Joyce continually tocreate new meanings and formal possibilities for his
book" (Thomas 139). Byexamining the language inUlvsses (Thomas, for instance, "link[s]
the book's, circularity to the nature of its language" [20]), andhow language in Ulvsses .
defuses linear thought, thereby leaving us with only possibilities, we can bettersee how
Ulvsses offers us a newmodel for knowing and, thus, for readingas a type of knowing: the
constant reformulation of previously helddefinitions which result in new tentative definitions
which will themselves tested and reformulated over and over again. But to understand why
we need to re-examinehow knowledgeworks in Ulvsses. first we must understandcriticism
which how love is known in Ulvsses: linearly, conclusively.
Regardless of how these critics assess love's immaterial/material quality or its
negative/positive quality inUlvsses. they all view the issue of love as something which can
be brought to closure,whether through induction or deduction. Regarding the question' of
materiality, for instance, Ellmann reaches the conclusion that love, aftermuch deliberation
and testing against various false notionsof lovewithin the book, involvesa union of body
and soul which resists sentimentality on one hand and brutality on the other. Regarding the
question of love's positiveness or negativeness, Boyleconcludes that love isn't universal
since it is only positive, not negative. In both instances, as in others, the critic finds a
conclusive definition of love within Ulvsses upon which to base further critical assessments
such as claims concerning the word known to all men.
This practice of bringing love to a clearconclusion, of supplying a cleardefinition for
love in Ulvsses. is based on the notion that Ulvsses iiltimately functions clearly and linearly
in its knowledge of love: it progresses from a starting point to a finishing point, or, as
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Thomas puts it, "[T]he reader experiences the odyssey ofreading the book only to return to
the 'rock of Ithaca,' where themotion stops" (161). This progression (aswithmost criticism,
it seems) usually moves inductively: thecritic gathers many instances from the text and
draws a general conclusion from them. John Gordon, for instance, in analyzing love's
connection to the word known as all men examines the role of the material and the spiritual
(immaterial) in how love is known. Heconcludes thatStephen's various musings on the
beachregarding Godand theosophy reveal thatStephen "assert[s] a real relation between
matter andspirit" (47), and that thatrelation is reified byUlvsses as a whole, affirming that
the spiritual (non-material) andthematerial are united in a "continuum" of which love is a
part (52). In this appeal toform alone, Gordon seeks closure to this aspect of thequestion of
love's nature in Ulvsses.
Thistypeof approach, a linear approach which functions in moving from a confusion
of data to a resolution of the data in the form of a general conclusion, does great damage to
knowing love in Ulvsses. though, if love in Ulvsses is not meant to be known in any
conclusivemanner through a process of induction and deduction. If knowledge of love in
Ulvsses operates perpetually recursively without closure, then to impose an epistemology
basedon closure would renderus incapable of knowing exactlywhat love is in Ulvsses. It
would render us incapableof understanding, really, that love is never brought to a conclusion
in Ulvsses. That, rather, our inability to finalize love in Ulvsses is itself meant to function as
a sign of meaningwhich shifts the responsibility of determining and understanding love from
the text to us, the readers. The critical decision, then, of bringing the issue of love in Ulvsses
to closure renders the text didactic; the critical decision to allow love in Ulvsses its ultimate
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ambiguity allows Ulvsses anopenness which ismore in line with itsepistemology of
possibility instead of closure.
To understand Ulvsses as perpetually recursive, though, is not the same as to
understandit as functioning in terms of the hermeneutic circle. For the hermeneutic circle,
meaning remains embedded in the textalone; eventually, the readers construct their senses of
unity basedon conclusions that canbe found within the text. In my notion of recursiveness, I
take Stanley Fish's understanding of the text's formal ambiguity as an opportunity for the.
1
readers'sign-making. The text, thoughwe can certainlyapply our notionsof structure and
form, in certain cases refuses closure, refuses the formation of a single coherent conclusion.
In this case, the readers find themselves confronted with various mutually exclusive
conclusions regarding the.text's formal meaning. Rather than seeking the meaning in the text
(which remains in a perpetual state of flux, recursiveness, formation and re-formation), the
reader takes this inconclusiveness itself as a sign. In this way "[m]eaning occurs through the
process of reading, and all reading requires interpretation" (Thomas 24).
For instance, in Fish's discussion ofMilton's use of the word "spare", he points out
that critics are stuck on a matter of interpretation: does "spare" mean that these delights in
question are to be avoided or enjoyed? Rather than remaining caught in this endless spiral of
formalist explication. Fish sees this ambiguity, this indeterminacy, as itself being a sign much
as a word is a sign. He claims that since the word "spare" can be understood in both senses,
as being avoided and being enjoyed, it remains for the readers in their own lives to decide
when these delights should and shouldn't be enjoyed. The text in this case offers no closure
or didactic lesson which the readers can use as a textbook for real life. Instead, the readers
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must take responsibility for their choices, recognizing, as "spare" points but initssignness,
that this is a difficult decision requiring much thought.
But even here I diverge fromFish. For Fish, this signification and the reader's
understanding of this signification takes place prim^ily inwhat hecalls thetemporal rather
than the spatial formalist realm. I disagree. Following the structuralist principles, I believe
that this formation of a sign canoccur spatially aswell as temporally; the readers notonly
form significations as they readthetext, butas they read their readings of thetext, and as
they re-read the text itself. As Thomas puts it, "To produce one pattern we have to go
through an act of reading, and to produce another pattern weneedto go through another act
of reading, creating an endless numberof structures" (162). So, for instance, after two
readings of Ulvsses. I mayformulate love as being a strictly material phenomenon. Aftera
secondreading, I may revise my previousassessment andconsider love a nonmaterial
phenomenon, and so on. OnceI havedecided that these readings are all viable yetmutually
exclusive, I can then treat them as a sign for reader-responseanalysis. In other words, the
data that readers have collected from the text is in itself a text which must be read in light of
future readings of the work. In the case of this thesis, then, it is the inability to read this data-
textin any coherent, closured way which demands that the readers readthis lackof
structural/formal closure as a type of sign.
Obviously, it is this notion of knowledge in Ulvsses which allows us access to love as
it is in Ulvsses: an indeterminate group of contradictory signs which force us to recognize
this recursive lack of closure as itself significant, as forcing the responsibility of reading back
on us, refusing to tell us conclusively what love is in Ulvsses.
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Perhaps here readers may observe that the account ofUlysses* epistemology which I
propose sounds suspiciously likethose linear accounts of love which I claim are inaccurate:
a conclusion (it functions recursively) basedon an inductive process. I only think that this
observation would be accurate if I claimed that every aspect of Ulysses was knowable only in
a recursive, sign-forming manner. I don't. Rather, I believe thatUlvsses functions much as a
Mandelbrot set does: it is an infinitepatternwhich is limited in direction. In other words,
the limited direction of the Mandelbrot set is, in terms of Ulvsses. the epistemology which it
establishes. The patternwhich recurs indefinitely wouldbe the definitionsof lovewhich
never work to a resolution, but incessantly spiral outward within the limits of Ulysses*
epistemology. And it is the fact that love spiralsperpetually inconclusively whichbecomes
the sign that we as readers must interpret. According to Thomas, Joyce makes several
variations of themes in this way to "[show] the pattern's infinite variety by repeating and
elaborating it ad infinituni" (87).
To see how it is that Ulvsses offers this vision of epistemology, we must
understand how language in Ulysses reveals knowledge to be a construction, not a necessary
revelation of truth. We must then consider the specific ways in which knowledge, despite
appeals to either a pre-linguistic body or pre-linguistic God, is demonstrated to be an
inconclusive construction, thereby challenging us to reread the meaning of love in Ulvsses in
light of this epistemology of perpetual recursiveness, of a non-transcendent center.
Before moving on, however, two problems with the following discussion need to be
anticipated. First, for these upcoming examples and assessments of language, am I assuming
that Joyce intended all of these ideas concerning the nature of language? No. Here I again
23
follow Thomas in his assessment of language and authorial intent: "[T]he nature of a book's
language shapes it as much as an author's or reader's consciousness" (9). "Thus, the tale of
the telling ultimately comes to include even the play of language not consciously 'intended'
by Joyce" (20). Thomas continues: "[I]n one sense, it is not really Joyce who is creating
these meanings or potential forms. They are meanings and forms already available in a
language that exists prior to any one reader or writer of that language" (139).
Am I saying then that Joyce didn't know what he was doing, that he intended
nothing? Again, following Thomas, no. "The examples of interpretation we find in Ulysses
encourage us to pay attention to words rather than to authorial intention. We can even argue
that Ulvsses' author intended it that way" (165). So when I claim that Joyce sets up a
Mandelbrot set, part of his parameters is indeed that slippage of language with which we are
now so familiar. Joyce could not have, though, anticipated every slip which his language
would make. Again, Thomas comments:
As more and more "coincidences" start to create a pattern of meaning, the reader finds
it impossible to believe that Joyce could have "intended" all the connections he finds.
Indeed Joyce may not have intended every one of the connections. The connections
may be the result of a system of signs that is prior to any one user of those signs. But
does that make the coincidences illegitimate in the context created by Ulvsses? Does
not Ulvsses encourage us to use our ingenuity to read what the play of l^guage might
reveal to us? (166)
But, further, the second problemmustbe anticipated: what then of themetaphors I
use? Did Joyce intend, for instance, that Bloom's entry into his home be understood as an
epistemological statement? A good startingpoint againwouldbe Thomas. HereThomas
assessesStephen's discussionof Shakespeare in the library: "While the chapter does not
prescribe amethod, it does present one example ofwhat happens when understanding takes
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place as the result of anencounter with a text" (167). In thesame way, then, does Bloom's
coming home function: as anencounter with the world which demonstrates one way in
whichwe form knowledge. However, that still begs the questionconcerning Joyce's
intention and metaphor.
Certainly, asThomas points out, Joyce himself used "thepossibilities ofmetaphor as
anorganizing principle" (2). Ametaphor would serve as one of the "linguistic codes" since
"the world and the self can be known only through a system of signs" (14). For instance, the
book's title, Ulysses, "serves as a metaphor, offering metaphors by whichwe can read it, such
as a book ofmany turns or a bookas an odyssey" (123). In this way, whether Joyceintended
it or not, "Ulvsses teaches us how to read it as we read It makes much more sense to read
Ulysses according to the metaphorsand interpretive models it provides than to try to base our
readingon some externalmethod that promises validity in interpretation" (146). Of course,
as Thomas points out, "even comingup with the text's interpretive models involvesan act of
interpretation" (146). Thus, we can't say that it's somehow "natural" to view "Aeolus" as "a
way of thinking about the technique of the entire book" (Carol Schloss in Thomas 157); it's a
matter of interpretation. And, thus, the problemwith trying to determine how Joyce wanted
us to read Bloom at home for instance: epistemological statement, or Bloom just coming
home, or both, or none? So, again, what's important is not so much Joyce's intent, but how
well the metaphor operates as a method of organization and as an interpretive model. And
this usefulness of metaphor as interpretive model is what Thomas focuses upon:
The pages ofUlvsses are full of models suggesting how to interpret such passages.
What these models offer is not a method by which we can be sure of hearing one
correct voice but a lesson on how to tune our ears so as to hear many voices, just as
Joyce did as he wrote, reread, and rewrote the book. Furthermore, these models imply
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that,just as Joyce's voicemixes with any attempt to resurrect the voices ofDublin, so
the reader's voicemixes with his attemptto resurrect the voices of Ulvsses. (158)
With these considerations of intention, language, and metaphor in mind, we are now
betterprepared to examine how language in Ulvsses problematizes knowledge of reality.
Despite appeals to biology and to theology asmethods of knowing a transcendent objective
reality, language in Ulvsses demonstrates to us the constructedness of all knowledge, our
inability to access a transcendent center. Beforeunderstanding how languageconstitutes
reality in Ulvsses.wemight be tempted to designate two primaryways of knowing objective
reality in Ulvsses: language, on the one hand, and on the other, what might be called pre-
lingual experience, either biological (through our sensual bodies) or divine (religion, for
instance).
First, language. Considering the torture whichwords themselves undergo in Ulvsses.
especially in episodes such as "Aeolus" and "Ithaca", not to mention "Oxen of the Sun". The
apparent confidence with which these critics discuss the word "love" is surprising. Under this
torture, words, rather than giving up their full identity, their full meaning, seem to recede
further and further into mysterious nebulousness. Why?
One notion which Ulvsses certainly challenges in its language is the notion that
language is able to clearly convey information. In the notion of clearly conveyed information,
closure is given when people think that they have perfectly matched the words that the
speakerhas said or writtenwith the meaningwhich the speakerhas intended. In this way,
language is thought to operate on a type of one-to-one ratio to meaning.
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By challenging this notion, Ulysses "[defamiliarizes] language itself (Thomas 140),
revealing language to be, insteadof an exact tool which refers to a world outside itself, a self-
reflexive entity. For if language operated on a one-to-one ratio to an external world, "[a]
perfect alignmentwould imply an identity; the book's actionwould coincidewith the book's
title; Bloom would equal Ulysses. But the connections between Joyce's tale and Homer's
tale never quite meet" (Thomas 122). As in "the case ofM'Intosh," these inconsistencies
"remind us of the split between signifier and referent" (Thomas 118). Thus, "the circularity
that we encounter so persistently in the history of literature could well be a product of
language itself, language that, in reaching out to portray a world beyond itself, inevitably
turns back naming only itself. In trying to identify, language ends by announcing itself as a
sign, leaving a gap between it and what it signifies" (Thomas 106).
The notion of language as a clear, well-lit path to meaning receives a serious blow in
Ulvsses. Rather than being a well-lit path, language in Ulvsses proves to be much like an
unlit New York subway at midnight with predators potentially at every turn. Language thus
reveals itself as sign through its inability to adequately convey exact knowledge, and its
ability to actively restrict knowledge.
As Stephen says to his imaginary conversation partner, "You find my words are dark"
(U 3.419). These words, like Stephen's writing, are "[s]igns on a white field" (U 3.415)
which must be read (understood) to seewhat they signify. Rather thanbeingclearly lit, these
words, these signs, dragus into darkuncertainty; asEglinton recognizes during the
discussion of Shakespeare with Stephen, "The doctor cantell us what those words mean" (U
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9.738). Stephenis himselfstumped at the ambiguity, the darkness of language, "I believe, O
Lord, helpmyunbelief. That is, helpme to believe or helpme to unbelieve?" (U 9.1079).
Stephen, of course, is not the only person who finds language somewhat inadequate to
the task of securely conveying knowledge. In the lecture hall of Barney Kieman's pub,
LeopoldBloom experiences this problemof language in a muchmore acutemanner. Bloom
is harassed into defining a nation: "A nation is the same people living in the same place" to
which Ned Lambert replies, "By God, then ... if that's so I'm a nation for Tm living in the
same place for the past five years" (U 12.1422-5). And again to define love; "[T]he opposite
of hate" (U 12.1485) to which the narrator responds ridiculously, "Love loves to love love"
(U 12.1493). Seemingly, then. Bloom has a much more difficult time knowing what the
word "love" means than many critics of Ulvsses do.
Judging from these representative examples, it would appear that language in Ulvsses.
rather than offering an avenue to conclusive knowledge, instead involves us in some way
with constructing that knowledge; we must choose from language's various possibilities
within our particular context. But this conclusion is only chosen out of convention, not
because the words themselves have forced us into one specific interpretation.
In the above case of Stephen's debate on belief/unbelief, a quick appeal to a Church
authority would probably reveal that the conclusion that the particular community has drawn
is that the Lord is meant to help the supplicant leam how to believe, rather than strengthening
the disbelief. This idea of language only having meaning within a certain community is very
much like Stanley Fish's notion of the interpretive community in which, by convention not
because the words have any necessary connection to their meanings, a community establishes
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the parameters within which meaning may be allowed for a certain word orstructure. So,
Stephen's meaning is shaped by the interpretive community within which he functions.
Butlanguage isnotonly dark because of itstentative relationship tomeaning and thus
to knowledge; it is also dark because itcan blot out knowledge, act as an eclipse on the sun of
knowledge. Language's ability to do harm can again beindicated in one ofStephen's
thoughts. During the Shakespeare discussion, Stephen urges himself to"[U]nsheathe [your]
dagger definitions" (U 9.84).
In a way, then, language canbe seen as a type of cutting. Butwhat is language
cutting? Again, it's cutting away information; it's cutting away knowledge. Theclearest
example of this cutting away, of language obscuring knowledge rather than leading us to it
occurs in the "Ithaca"episode. In thisepisode, language can convey nothing of the emotion
orbonding between Bloom andStephen. Instead, it canonly scientifically report Stephen's
andBloom's actions, leaving out anyothertype of information which the reader might want
to know. In thisway,Thomas claims, "Ithaca" [leads us] to see the limitations of the
question-and-answer method, which assumes thatforeach question there is a definite
answer" (119).
This cutting of language couldbe viewed as a type of harm, a typeof damage done to
knowledge itself in that it excludes otherpossibilities in its desire for final closure. In fact,
wesee anotherexample of language being viewed as limiting rather thanconveying
possibility during Stephen's discussion with Deasy during "Nestor". Deasy chooses an
extremely punitive definition of the word "just" in his thinking on howmuch money should
be given to others. In commenting on howeveryone needs to be able to pay their ownway
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eventually, Deasy says, "We are a generous people but we must also be just" (U 2.263).
Stephen here recognizes that this definition, this word "just" as it exists in this context, does a
type oflimiting rather than allowing for possibility. He responds, "I fear those big words ...
which make us sounhappy" (U2.264). Stephen here sees that Deasy, like others, can use a
word a certain way toeliminate possibility (the possibility here that justice might entail more
giving to the poor than Deasy iswilling to accommodate), tobring about a closure which is
amenable tohis purposes rather than admitting to possibility. So just as the language of
"Ithaca" restricts possibility, so do the words of Deasy.
But sometimes it is eagerly admitted thatlanguage acts as a barrier to possibility of
knowledge, whether through its production of endless vague possibilities or through its
elimination of possibility. In thisway, some try to avoid the claim that language is
everything. Instead, they appeal to a pre-linguistic knowledge, an intuitive experience
perceived by themind, usually mediated, not by language, butby direct experience ofeither
the pre-linguistic body orof a pre-linguistic God. Butaswe seeinUlvsses. even this
supposed "direct experience" becomes subject to language.
In remembering howLeopoldexplained to her themeaning ofmetempsychosis,
Molly indicates this dilemma of bodily knowledge: "... I asked himabout... thatword met
something with hoses in it andhe came outwith some jawbreakers about the incarnation he
never canexplain a thing simply theway a body can understand" (U 18.565-7). Though
. Molly'schoice of theword "body" cansurely be accounted for as anexample of idiom (i.e.
theway somebody canunderstand), it also indicates herdesire to know something which
language (Bloom's "jawbreakers") seems to obstruct. Probably because Molly is so
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comfortable with her body (as her ruminations would indicate), she feels thatif this
knowledge could beconveyed directly, bodily, inaway that a body could understand, then
she wouldn't have to deal with the difficulties of Bloom's jawbreakers.
Stephen shares this belief inbodily knowledge; knowledge will beconveyed tohim
through a physical, bodily encounter with a woman. Most clearly, Stephen sees hisliterary
birth being associated witha woman, much asShakespeare's was. When ruminating on
Shakespeare's seduction byAnne Hathaway, Stephen wonders, "Waitto bewooed and won.
Ay,meacock. Whowillwooyou?" (U9.938) and thenremembers his failedattempt to
escape to Europe so hemay become an artist, "You flew. Whereto? ... Paris and back" (U
9.952-3). This artistic knowledge, then, is seen as being conveyedthrough a bodily, not a
linguistic, experience.
A "direct experience"of the body, though, maybe more problematic than these
characters think. Rather than serving as a secure refuge of knowledge for those who have
tiredof language's inability to communicate knowledge, the body itselfcanbe made subject
to knowledge, and therefore problematized itself as an avenue of knowledge. The clearest
exampleof this problematization of the body throughlanguageoccurs in a book about the
body which Bloomreads, '-Aristotle's Masterpieces". Here, language shapes the way that
Bloom, and we, for that matter, can understand and experience the body. Stephen Soud
comments:
[Molly's disgust at "Aristotle's Masterpieces] is a feminist critique of a treatise for
midwives pervertedby its male author(s). Somethingin Bloom and the medical
students responds to the near-poraographic titillation which the book offers them. As
Molly surely recognizes, in a subtlerfashion the book is a male inscription of a female
process. "Aristotle's" usurpation of the feminine is borne out in passages like this ...
: "Such sometimes is the power of the [male] seed, that the male may be conceived in
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the left side, as well as the right." This male appropriation of the female body
achieves explicit, visual representation in the chromolithographic illustrations, which
treat a fetishized female body as the object of vivisection. (202)
The body, then, does not always exist in someway outside of language, but is indeed formed
and shaped by language in our minds, thus restricting even the body's ability to convey
possible knowledge since it itself is language.
This notion that the body does not pre-exist language or exist outside of language can
be found in the thought of Jacques Lacan. As Madan Sarap puts it, "Lacan understands the..
. that there is no such thing as the body before language. Biology is always interpreted by
the human subject" (25). Thomas would add, "Language does not lead us to a direct
apprehension of the world but instead reminds us of its existence as language" (10).
The body is not the only refuge to be sought from language's seeming monopoly on
constructing knowledge. The Divine can be seen as a secure avenue for knowledge, divine
inspiration, if you will, a direct infusion of knowledge which bypasses the problematic and
obstructing dark language. The clearest example of a divine knowledge which surpasses
language is, ironically enough, the Incarnation of the Word as Gerty reflects on it: "Our
Blessed Lady herself said to the archangel Gabriel be it done unto me according to Thy
Word" (U 458-9).
And the narration of "Naussica" reflects this type of immediate divine experience
stylistically when it describes Gerty exposing her underwear to Bloom: "[H]er face was
suffused with a divine, an entrancing blush from straining back" (U 723). The pause which
occurs after divine at first makes us stop and consider the word "divine" as a noun, as if a
divine were a ghost or spirit of some sort of which Gerty gains direct knowledge. In other
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words, this passage can obviously be read as merely describing a blush as divine (adjective),
but the style of the episode, the constantjuxtapositionof Gerty to the VirginMary, allows
that this "divine" may also be considered to be a stylistic Incarnation.
This desire for an intuitive experience of the divine free from language, however, like
the word "divine" itself and the experience of the body becomes qualified, shaped by
language. We can see this qualification in the thoughts of Fr. Conmee during the
"Wandering Rocks" episode. Conmee considers the souls of the millions of unbaptized
people in the world and reflects that the "book by the Belgian jesuit, Le Nombre des Elus,
seemed ... a reasonable plea" (U 10.183). According to Gifford and Seidman, this book, for
its time, was a rather liberal theological assessment of how many people would go to hell and
how many would go to heaven:
The book argued that the great majority of souls would be saved; it was immediately
attacked as too 'liberal' by the dogmatists, or 'rigorists,' who claimed that all who
were not baptized as Catholics were subject to eternal damnation. (263)
Here, it would seem, that we cannot be too quick to say that the divine is always and
everywhere capable of direct communication with our minds. We would be safer in saying,
then, that, at least in Ulvsses. the divine's ability to communicate with our minds is
problematized by language, specifically in this case, the language of theology, and for the
people who Gerty overhears at their retreat, the "familiar words" of prayer (U 13.289).
Once we see that the knowledge in Ulysses is at least problematized, if not simply
constructed, we can better recognize how its knowledge does function, how it functions
recursively without definitive conclusion. A model which we could use for this type of
epistemology is given to us in the tramcars at the beginning and end of "Aeolus". At the
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beginning of "Aeolus", the tramcars, at the "HEART OFTHEHIBERNIAN METROPOLIS"
(U7.1-2), are operating, bringing people to andfrom thecentral station. But by the endof
the episode, the tramlines have fallen dead, as described in a section titled "HELLO THERE,
CENTRAL!":
At various points along the eight linestramcars with motionless trolleys stoodin their
tracks, bound for or from [various places], all still, becalmed in short circuit. Hackney
cars, cabs, delivery waggons, mailvans, private broughams, aerated mineral water
floats vvith rattling crates of bottles, rattled, rolled, horsedrawn, rapidly. (U 7.1042-
1059)
Linear-start-to-finish knowledge, then, it seems, functions much as the tramcars do:
it's short-circuited, made problematic. Perhaps it will be repaired, but, as is the case here,
other forms of transportation, other forms of knowledge are still available, as they always
have been. But the notion of a direct access to a central, conclusive, or beginning knowledge,
to the heart of a matter, or to the intuitive heart of a person, must not be definitively held.
What once worked no longer operates.
If we recognize the the tramcar incident was not put in the "Aeolus'* episode by
accident, we can further recognize, not only what this tramcar model says about the futility of
previous epistemologies, but also what this episode says as a whole about present and future
epistemologies and their existence in and applicability to Ulvsses in which, as James Maddox
says, "a collocation of details [point] toward an unnamable center" (in Thomas 13). Let us
view the tramcars as people (readers, for instance) and the tracks as the various ways in
which people come to know reality (the 'meaning' of Ulvsses, for instance), the central
station, if you will. If a central station cannot be accessed, what are we left with? We are left
with no certain knowledge, only several possibilities, much as "Aeolus" itself leaves us with
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many rhetorical linguistic possibilities from which we and the characters may choose how to
construct reality.
Aswe've seen, language and knowledge are closely intermingled inUlysses in away
which indicates that there is no centralknowlege to whichwe gain access; there are only
different linguistic constructions. So thequestion could be asked, which way of using
language, which tramcar, is the best to one touse toconstruct knowledge? Oreven, which
construction of knowledge is best?
"Aeolus" offers us everything from Abbreviation (U7.980) to Zeugma (7.427-28)
(Gifford andSeidman 642-643) in an attempt to show us that we are left to choose; the book
will not choose for us. Regarding Ulvsses in general, Thomas claims that
[o]nce we realize that what we are given is not an objective account of a Dublin
reality but someone's interpretation of it, weare in a betterposition to see that all the
book's styles are interpretive schemas, ways of seeing theworld, not theworld itself.
Since choosingone style assumes interpretive schemas that another style excludes,
Joyce's encyclopedia of styles creates the illusion that language reaches out to
"capture" a reality, but repeatedly falls short. (125)
These possibilities, therefore, are no longerjoined by a coherent,stable center stationof
knowledge "out there" if you will. This notion of knowledge, of a center to which we
respond that is no longera stable center, is discussed byStanley Fish as well. When asked
what it is that we respond to when we construct our readings, if not a central text in the first
place, somethingformally "out there", separate from our own constructing of it, Fish
responds that he doesn't know. But he also adds that we don't know either (1249).
This doesn't mean, though, that we have no center, just that the center we have is
always constructed and re-constructed. As Derrida indicates, the center "must be thought of
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as a series of substitutions of center for center, as a linked chain of determinations of the
center. Successively, and in regulated fashion, the center receives differentforms or names"
(960). This type of center-constructedness stands in sharp contrast to linear thought. As with
the trams which go forth and to the same center over and again, so does linear thought return
and go forth from the same center, the same definitions; it seeks to reify itself everywhereit
sets its gaze. Recursive thought, though, goes forth from a "central" station and, like the
trams in Dublin, never returns to that same central station. In the case of recursive thought,
they never return because that center can no longer exist as a result of their having gone forth.
It isn't a matter of returning to the same center that has added a few new features; the fact that
it has new features makes it a different center, a new center. It is no longer center, but
cEnter; never having been "natural" nor "pre-existent" to our gaze, the cEnter merely
acknowledges it's createdness.
The notion of the unstable center, the way in which Ulvsses "lacks a normative
center" (Thomas 161), can be seen in the general workings of Ulvsses itself (whatever that is)
and its characters (whoever those are). A model for this type of recursive knowledge, a
"return" to the cEnter (or the cEnter, for that matter) can be found when Bloom "returns" to
his "home", the cEnter. As Thomas comments, "When Bloom returns home he finds the
furniture rearranged In a world founded upon the incertitude of the void rather than the
myth of the fixed center, things seem to fall apart. Or, if they do not fall apart, they do not
lend themselves to perfect returns" (104). We can see this in several ways. First of all,
Bloom does not use a linear method to enter, to gain knowledge, if you will. He has no key,
no direct access. Rather, as with the people who use alternative indirect measures of
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transportation with the trams having been shut down. Bloom enters through awindow inhis
house, a surreptitious type of access. And, aswith all accesses to knowledge gained through
language, his entrance is intoa-dark area, a different area it soon becomes known when he
smacks his head into the rearranged furniture.
This then, is the model of knowledge withwhichUlysses presentsus: rather than
taking thetram(linguistic, experiential, you name it) directly to a never-changing, eternally
samereality that can be known fully, we find ourselves working indirectly, coming to centers
which are different from the centers which we had before, centers which we don't entirely
recognize.
This inability occurs in two notableexamples: other people'sknowledgeof Bloom,
and Stephen's knowledge of himself. In the case of Bloom, visions of him fluctuate between
the penny-pinching, horse-racewinningJewwhowon't stand for drinks to the goodmanwho
will put down five shillings for the poorDignam boy; from themanwhohas a touch of the
artist in him, to Molly's inartistic husband. Perhaps it couldbe said that ALL of these visions
are Bloom, yet it is doubtful, for instance, that Bloom did and didn't win the race of the day.
It is possible, though, thatBloomat times is artistic andat othertimes isn't artistic, but it isn't
possible that Bloom always has something artistic to himyet at the same has nothing artistic
to him. In this case, then, these various people could not say that their linguistic
constructions of Bloom fully encapsulate a "central Bloom".
Like the trams, these vehicles for knowing Bloom short-circuit on their way to him (if
there is a "him" to know in the first place). So we as readers are left with several possibilities
rather than with a conclusive portrait of Bloom. Gould we take all of these fragments and put
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themtogether for a coherentBloom? No, because we'dstill haveLeopold-who-won-the-
Ascot-Race-bet-today-because-he-bet-for-Throwaway-but-is-too-cheap-to-pay-for-drinks-
Bloom andLeopoId-who-didn't-even-bet-on-the-race-and-has-no-idea-what-
everyone-in-the-bar's-mad-about-Bloom. Certainly, as readers, we experienceFish's temporal
process in which we formulate and re-formulate Bloom based on these characters
observations and our own as we move from page one to that final "yes."
Not only do the characters in Ulvsses have difficulty knowing a central other, they
even have trouble knowing a central self. Take the example of Stephen again. During his
discussion in the library, Stephen ruminates on what exactly constitutes who he is, his central
self. When considering his debt to A.E., Stephen thinks
Wait. Five months. Molecules all change. I am other I now. Other I got pound....
But I, entelechy, form of forms, am I by memory because under everchanging forms.
I that sinned and prayed and fasted. A child Conmee saved from pandies. I, I and I.
1. (U 9.205-212) '
Here the difficulty of determining whether identity (a center) is consistent throughout time, or
whether identity changes anew from moment to moment becomes particularly acute. What is
perhaps most significant about this passage though in its commentary on this issue of
centrality is exactly that: its significance. Rather than offering closure, it, in a much more
overt way than the question of Bloom's identity, leaves the issue open to debate; this
unresolvable contradiction itself becomes a sign of the difficulty of the question concerning
centrality and the precariousness of knowledge. In this case, which is it? Is Stephen 1,1 (the
continuous I which contains all the possibilities: Stephen is the I that sinned, the I that
prayed, the I that fasted, the I saved by Conmee, the I who owes A.E. a pound, a cumulative
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central I which, like snowball rolling down the ski-hill simply accumulates more and more
content) or is Stephen 1. I. (thediscontinuous I; there was a Stephen whosinned who was
different than the Stephenwho fasted, who was differentthan the Stephenwho prayed, who
was differentfrom the Stephensavedby Conmee, whowas differentfrom the Stephenwho
owes A.E. a pound, whowasdifferent than the Stephen whojust had that thought, even, a
series of skips in the water created by a stone of a world)?
What is left then to us as readers? To become sign-readers. To recognize the
impossibility of resolvingthese conflicts and see the conflicts themselves as signs: to
creatively fill in the gaps between the sign and its significance. A model for this, too, can be
found in Ulvsses. When the readers first come across the letters H.E.L.Y.'S, they may just
read it as letter H, letter E, letter L, etc. Eventually, through an act of creative insight, the
reader connects these letters, not as separate from each other (which they are), but as
signifying the Dublin store, Hely's. So, just as each different identity of Bloom and Stephen
functions as an H. or an E. upon first glance, we as readers can put them together, not
necessarily resolving them formally into a coherent whole, but as seeing them signifying as a
collected group something outside of themselves, in this case, the inability to know directly
in a linear conclusive un-recursive way.
The further difficulty arid challenge of this Ulvsses-esque epistemology then is to see
how is applies to our knowledge of love in Ulvsses. how it leads us to a more satisfying
account of love in Ulvsses than previous accounts which relied upon a method which
culminated in a linear, final conclusion about love's nature in Ulvsses.
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CHAPTER 3. LOVE AS MATBRIAL/NONMATERIAL
Obviously, with a novel ascomplex asUlysses, maiiy questions arise during one's
reading. One of these questions thatcanarise from a reading ofUlvsses concerns the
relationship between the non-material and thematerial worlds. This dilemma becomes
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apparent in thescientific-materialist description ofthe non-material afterworld during the
mock-seance for Paddy Dignam in the "Cyclops" episode; again in "Aeolus" when Bloom
conmients that a machine could smash a man to atoms (material), yet needs a mind (non-
material) to keep themfromprinting the same thing "overandup andback" (U7.103); and
again in "Aeolus" in professor MacHugh's tirade against theBritish: "I speakthe tongue of a
race the acme of whose mentality is the maxim: time is money. Material domination.
Domine! Lord! Where is the spirituality?" (U 7 557-8).
Symbolically, this dilemmaof the material and non-material becomes painfully clear
during the discussionof the human heart in "Hades": is it just anotherbrokenmaterial pump
in the graveyard (U 6.674), or is it indeed the seat of non-material human affections, of
human love? Is it touched by Christ's words,"/ am the resurrection and the lifeT (U 6.670),
a place wherematter and non-mattermeet in union? Or, as Bloomputs it, is "theheart" just
another powerless metaphor, a purely wishful, spiritualist fantasy?: "The resurrection and the
life. Once you are dead you are dead. That last day idea. Knocking them all up out of their
graves. Come forth, Lazarus! And he came fifth and lost the job" (U 6.677).
To understand love in Ulvsses. we have to choose which aspects would most benefit
from examination. Because of problematic images such as the heart, and the actions and
thoughts of various characters such as Bloom, Stephen, Molly, etc., one aspect which would
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seem to demand an examination is this relationship between the body (thematerial) and the
soul/mind (the non-material) and their various roles in Ulysses' version(s) of love. To do so,
I will first consider the formalist nature of previous discussions of love, thereby redirecting us
to the typeofmethodwe'll be using to understand love in Ulvsses: Stanley Fish's reader-
'response. I will then consider at great length theviable readings of love inUlvsses: the
materialist, the nonmaterialist, and then the unionist readings of love. I will conclude with a
brief consideration of how Fish's method allows us to make the seemingly insoluble
formalist readings of love in Ulvsses useful by allowing us to make them signifymeaningin
themselves rather than endlessly trying to bring about formalist closure. In this way, I hope
to understand love in Ulvsses in a way consonant with the epistemology ofUlvsses as
discussed in the previous chapter: an epistemology of inconclusion. As Stephen observes
during "Scylla and Charybdis", the "world [is founded] [u]pon incertitude" (U 9.843).
But first, to see this dilemma clearly, we have to at least have some definitions of the
two main terms: nonmaterial and material. To do so, I'll use Ellmann's assessment of what
becomes unified in love. He says that "love is a blend ofmind and body", and that "love can
... claim to be all soul or all body, when only in the union of both can it truly exist" (xiii). It
seems, then, that the tension lies between two sources: the mind/soul on the one hand, and
the body on the other. So, for purposes of this thesis, I will be viewing the mind/soul as
nonmaterial (immaterial) realities, whereas the body (atoms, forms of tangible matter) will be
material realities. The first is ethereal, spiritual, untouchable, invisible, whereas the second is
earthly, material, touchable, visible.
41
Thathaving been said, wecannow focus onhow, as Fish points out, theprocess of
reading forrecursivity demands "the equal availability ofboth interpretations" which results
in "anapparently insoluble problem" (1242). Therefore, I hope to demonstrate that the
problem of how thematerial and non-material relate concerning love inUlvsses is indeed an
insoluble problem. To do this, I mustdiscuss three possible, mutually exclusive
interpretations of love in Ulvsses: love as strictly material, love as strictly non-material, and
love as union of the material and non-material.
So, with these definitions in mind, as indicated above, not only must we first choose
which aspect to examine, wemust alsochoose how to examine it. Though previous critics
have underplayed the issueofmateriality andnon-materiality in regard to love, they havestill
made claims about this relationship. And as brief as these claims may be, they nevertheless
display one commonality: they all follow a format of bringing the issue to conclusion or at
least desiringconclusion. In the case of HughKenner, for instance, Kenner claimsthatMolly
resides over a world of the dead, the loveless. In making this claim, Kenner obviously
believes that love cannot be considered solely as a material phenomenon. He would seem to
view love as being, if not solely spiritual, at least as being a material which necessarily
involves a spiritual, transcendent entity.
Fox, meanwhile, claims that love must be embodied, enfleshed. As with Kenner,
Fox's assessment of the relationship between the material and non-material must be
somewhat guessed at. Does she mean that the non-material spiritual entity of love exists
first, and then becomes infused in the material world? Or that this spiritual reality is already
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there andmust only be acknowledged for love to exist? Thatlove cannot exist without one
or the other?
Thislastpossibility sounds very much like Ellmann's claim that love is a union of the
body and mind/soul. Love does notexist as just amaterial reality or asjust a non-material
reality. In fact, a solely material ornon-material reality which claims to be love is, in
actuality, only a foil against which we candetermine love's truenature: union of the two.
Otherwise, love "can degenerate into dreamycreaminess or into brutishness" (Prefacexiv).
The problem with this type of approach to love inUlvsses is that it doesn't produce
verydesirable results. Rather thanproviding the conclusive answer to which it claims access,
the conclusive center, a strictlyconclusiveformalist approach only produces answer after
inadequate contradictory answer. This dilemmais very similarto what StanleyFish
describes in his "Interpreting the Variorum":
[Ejvidence brought to bear in the course of formalist analyses— that is, analyses
generatedby the assumption thatmeaning is embedded in the artifact—will always
point in asmany directionsas there are interpreters; that is, not only will it prove
something, it will prove anything. (1241)
What can we do then? Obviously, we don't stop reading, but we can "substitute one
set of questions for another" (Fish 1242). Rather than' askingquestions which seek formalist
closure (i.e. What is the relationship between the material and non-material realities in
regards to love in Ulvsses?). we can ask the question in a waywhichparallels the way in
which knowing itself takes place in Ulvsses: not with closure as the goal, but with
recursivity: what does it mean that the materiality/nonmateriality of love is an issue in
readings of Ulvsses?
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This new process consists of
[beginning] with an apparently insoluble problem and proceed[ing], not to solve it,
but to make it signify; first by regarding it as evidenceof an experience and thenby
specifying for that experience a meaning. (Fish 1242)
Andonce I have established that this problemremains insoluble, I will demonstrate that this
problem, rather thanbeingbest approached as a problem to be conclusively solved, maybe
more fruitfully approached as a problem to be viewed as a signifier. In doing so, I will
explainhow the problem of love's materiality/non-materiality evidenceof an experience that
has a meaning. In this case, we experience the confusion of determining how the material
and the non-material interact in matters of love, that we can never be satisfied with our
understanding of this confusion; we must constantly be revising it.
To understand the formalist viability of these three readings and their irreconcilability,
we could begin with an examination of one viable interpretation: love as immaterial in
Ulvsses. One starting point could be that whichKenner makes: love cannot be a strictly
material phenomenon. In Kenner's explication of love in Ulvsses. love would seem to be one
more transcendent virtue which exists apart from the world but can be possessed through our
material actions just as other virtues are held by Bloom in some "admirable balance" (Kenner
189).Love, then, exists prior to and outside of any of our material actions; like a Platonic
form, however, it must be accessed through our material actions which, devoid of these
transcendental virtues, leave us at the level of soulless beasts. Once accessed, it would seem
to become what Kimball refers to when she sees that love must have "a tie to the flesh" (152).
But, as Kenner points out, Ulvsses is a world which often shuts itself off from these
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transcendent virtues througli its own actions, leavingMolly to reign over a world of beastly
materialistreality, love shining on in the seemingly overwhelming materialistdarkness.
This view of Kenner's, of love as a pre-existing non-material reality which then
infuses the world through our material actions, can be seen as a struggle throughout the book.
We see this struggle in the imagery of the heart. What else, after all, is the material heart
touched by but the promise of the resurrectionwhereby the material body is translated into a
non-material world? "I am the Resurrection and the life. That touches a man's inmost heart"
(U 6.670). If we then read Ulvsses as Mr. Keman here reads the world, we can see a non-
material reality reaching out to infuse the dead material reality (the heart) with life, with a
transcendent non-material reality. And these non-material realities such as the resuitection
exist beyond and without the material world.
This placement of the spiritual above and before the material, much like MacHugh's
lament that the world lacks spirituality in the face of materialism, gains more credence in this
reading of Ulvsses if we see how Fr. Conmee's view of how the Catholic Church reads the
relationship between the spiritual and the material. When he regards the victims of a
ferryboat accident in New York, he reflects, "[T]hey were God's souls created by God" (U
10.150-1), and he later considers God's activity in the material world: "Fr. Conmee reflected
on the providence of the Creator who had made turf to be in bogs whence men might dig it
out and bring it to town and hamlet to make fires in the houses of poor people" (U 103-6).
In this example, we can see the belief that God pre-existed the world. And since this God is
Love, love woiild seem to be primarily and foremost a non-material reality which infuses the
material world with virtue.
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An even clearer demonstration of this need for love to infuse a dead, beastly material
world can be seen during Gerty's reflections upon theretreat atMary Star of the Sea Church.
Shementions the Incarnation, whereby Christ, the pre-existent Son of God, came "down"
fromHeaven,became conceivedas a material humanbeing inMary'swomb. Obviously,
what enabled this Incarnation was thematerial cooperation of a human beingalready infused
with God's love: Mary's great "Yes" to the angel, Gabriel.
And this infusion of immaterial love into an otherwise dead material world can still
take place as othermothers model Mary's material cooperation with thenon-material God.
For instance, let us takeMinaPurefoy. Mina's lastname means "pure faith", foy beingGreek
for faith. Mina herehas her pure faith in Christ's Church on earth thather refusal to use birth
control and bear eight children is in God's eyes an act of love, infusing the world with the
immaterial virtue. Mina thereby, according to this reading, re-enacts Mary's "Yes", and
accepts God's will, infusing theworld with lovethrough her acceptance andbirthing of a
child.
Motherly love in Ulvsses seems to be a greatmaterial medium for this non-material
reality. When Stephen thinks of all thatis real, he speculates as towhether amother's love is
theonlytruly real thingin theworid (U2.140). Without this spiritual infusion of love,
motherly lovedegenerates into thesappy, cruel sentimentalism of a Gerty MacDowell, who
at onemoment can imagine herselfbeinga greatmother, and at the next, snapat the actual
children for being too annoying, not quite displaying thatpurefaith which Minadisplays in
her patiencefor givingbirth over a 17hour period.
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Butnon-material love may not only beconveyed through thematerial medium of the
mother. The father asweirmay serve as this conduit. With the father, however, the issue of
the spiritual non-materiality of love becomes more acute. Rather than the father being, as
perhaps one may view itwith the mother, aprimarily biological function, the father iswhat is
called inUlvsses "amystical estate" (U9.838). Wecan view thefather, then, as itself, like
love, existing apart from material reality.
We see thismostclearly in the examples of Simon Dedalus andLeopold Bloom's
relationships with Stephen. To those who hold the idea of fatherhood as being hewho
physically begets a child, Simon Dedalus would obviously be the father. But this notion
ignores this argument's claim that there exists a spiritual, non-material world before and
outside the material world. If we understand that fatherhood, like love, must infuse the
material through a cooperation on the human agent's part, then wecan betterunderstand how
Simon andLeopoldfunction. In fact, wemustunderstand thatwhatconstitutes fatherhood is
exactly this infusion of love into the world on the part of a male for a son-figure.
From this pointof view of fatherhood beinga type of lovebeinga non-material entity
infused into the world through a material action, it couldbe said that SimonDedalus does not
love his children, is not a father. He drinks irresponsibly, spendshis days in the bars, denies
his child moneywhen she confronts himjust for some small change (U 10.680). In contrast,
he waxes sentimental about his son rather than making any concrete actions to help him (U
6.63-71). It would seemthat he onlycaresabouthis children's welfare when it allows himto
appear indignant before his friends on theway to a funeral.
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According to this hne of argument, then, Stephen, fatherless, becomes fathered by
Leopold Bloom who takes amaterial action which infuses theworld with love. This material
actionwouldbe Bloom's saving of Stephenfrom the brothel and continuingon to Bloom's
taking Stephen home andnourishing him. In this sense, through an action. Bloom has tapped
that transcendental loVe (despite whatKenner claims), saidyes to love, and in thatway, has
fathered Stephen.
This view of love as a pre-existent, immaterial reality admits to possibleproblems,
though. Love can easily be used as a convenient cover for cheap sentimentalization; the
immaterial can become the stuff of immaterial fantasies and ghouls rather than the immaterial
stuff of eternity.Love can become, rather than thatwhichmakes a womanstay in child-labor
for seventeen hours for her child, a dreamy sentimental fantasy which makes the heart go
"pitter-patter" (U 13.411), ending in a wish that children, rather than being bom, wouldjust
go away so the fantasies can be indulged. As in the case of Gerty MacDowell, then, "love"
can devolve into that which denies love being infused into the world rather than that which
makes love incarnate; which, unlike Mary, refuses to bring Christ into the world, preferring
its own pleasurable daydreams.
And the danger of misunderstanding the spiritual immateriality of love can also lead
to paralyzingfear, superstitions whichcripple the mind, render action impossible. It would
seem that this misunderstanding of love's immaterial nature involves the mistaken imposition
of our own imperfect world on that of the ideal immaterial world. For instance, when the
seance of Paddy Dignam is described in the pseudo-scientific jargon of the theosophists, we
can recognize the silliness of describing an immaterial world in spatial, material terms.
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So it is withStephen's 'vision' of hismother. In this case,Stephen imposes his
material world experiences ofjealousy andmaternal possessiveness onto thepure world of
immaterial love, of an immaterial God who exists outside of and before any sin or
shortcoming in thematerial world. Sojust asGerty MacDowell misunderstands thenature of
the immaterial world, degrading it to the status of creampuffromanticism, so does Stephen
misunderstand the immaterial world, reducing it to a realm of petty jealousies and
manipulative mother-ghouls.
Ironically enough, it is this verymisunderstanding of the immaterial, the reduction of
the immaterial to nothingmore than a shadow of our flightierdesires and baser fears in this
material world, which can be seized upon in a reading which turns this first viable reading of
love upside-down. Rather than reading love as a non-material reality existentbefore and
outside of the material world, this second equally viable reading would view the notion of
non-material love as nothing more than a fantasy. The world, in this viewpoint, is nothing
more than a material phenomenon, hot incapable of being infusedwith love just becauseof a
lack of material cooperation, but because love as a non-material phenomenon simply doesn't
exist. And from a study of how various characters read the world as a strictly material
phenomenon, we can construct a vision of Ulvsses whichwould read love in much the same
way: a fantasy rnade to mask the stark reality that the world is just a meaningless ball of
atoms.
In this view ofUlvsses. we can see throughout the book the reduction of seemingly
eternal non-material realities to the status of mere material realities. The book, in fact, begins
with this very reduction in Buck Mulligan's mock Mass. Here we see the reduction of the
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Eucharist to the status ofmateriality. When Mulligan acts as the priest, it's not to change the
bread into thebody of Christ through a non-material spiritual mystical process. Instead, it's
simply a matter of thematerial electricity: "Switch off thecurrent, willyou?" (U28-9).
Other places throughout thebook re-enact this same reduction: according toBloom,
the heart, rather thanbeing that which hears the non-material call to Resurrection, only
pumps blood until it breaks; according toMulligan, death doesn't involve "apoor soul gone
to heaven" (U 2.147); the brain's lobes simply stop functioning. This principle of reduction
therefore, functions by looking at material phenomena, human actions, and offering an
interpretation of these material phenomena based, noton any beliefin a non-material world
such as heaven, but on the belief that the world only involves atoms. Within this view, then,
all nonmaterial considerations are wishful thinking, something we have created.
The questionmust then be asked, if we are to read the world, andUlvsses, as these
charactersdo, what does this process of reduction meanfor a non-materialist vision of love as
pre-existent? The answer is quite a bit. A good place to startmight be a mother's love, which
for the non-material view of love holds a particularly important place, as we saw. As
considered earlier, the mother's union with her child can be viewed through the metaphor
Stephenuses: "Yet someonehad borne him [Sargent], borne him in her arms and in her
heart" (U 2.140). Once we view the heart as a mere pump, our belief in the nouTmaterial
union of mother and child is betrayed, revealed to be that which it really is: a strictly material
phenomenon. In this case, then, though Stephen would view it otherwise, allmotherly love
really is is the physical preservationof the child, keeping the child from beingcrushedby the
race: "But for her the race of the world would have trampled him underfoot, a squashed
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boneless snail" (U2.141-2). In this sense, thematerialist vision of love appears to benomore
infused by some non-material will thandoes Darwinist evolution.
But this reduction involves more than a mother's love; it also involves the love
between spouses. In the Catholic Church, sexual intercourse has been viewed by some
theologians as a renewal ofChrist's love for the world, much as the EUcharist renews Christ's
sacrifice on theCross. According to a materialist reading ofUlvsses, though, this notion of
intercourse receives serious attack. Rather than being a material actionunitedwith the love
of an immaterial God, intercourse is merely an action undertaken for sheermaterial pleasure,
not unlike the dogs which Mollywatches before sheurges Bloomto the intercourse which
conceives Rudy. In this reading, intercourse does notshare in thereality of an immaterial
world; it is only two physical bodies in a material action.
A clear demonstration of this reduction occurs during the 'Oxen of the Sun' episode.
AsBllmann points out, "[T]he medical students scorn love anddeal onlywith the
intromission of male into female parts" (xiii). ThoughEllmann of course intends to
demonstrate that this vision of intercourse-love serves to highlight the 'true' form of love
(union of material [body] and non-material worlds [soul/mind]), I still agree with his
assessment of the medical students.
In a materialist reading of Ulvsses. though, the medical students don't serve as foils to
the 'true' definition of love; they are it. The contrast between love as immaterial and love as
material becomes acute in the medical student passage from "Oxen in the Sun." Just as
Mulligan reducesdeath from a heaven-bound soul to the cessationof brain activity, so do the
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medicals reduce love froman action partaking in eternal love to a timewhen two people
"sport, clip, clasp, sunder" (U 14.394).
We see this materialist view of intercourse when the medical students respond to
Stephen's Catholic considerations of contraception during "Oxen of theSun". In response to
Stephen's dilemma "[b]ut, gramercy, what of those Godpossibled souls thatwenightly
impossibilize, which is the sin against theHoly Ghost, Very God, Lord and Giver of Life?"
(U 14.225-7) several of the drunken medicals respond that they would happily dispense of
their lust with a woman: "[Dixon] would ever dishonest a woman whoso she were or wife or
maid or lemen" (U 14.230-1). In this materialist reduction, the medicals praise that very
materialismwhich Stephen argues against: intercourse, rather than a marital sign of God's
love for the world, is only a material action. After all, if no pre-existent love exists out of the
world to be infused into the world, much as the soul is infused in the child, then the only
infusion is that which Ellmann discusses: the material infusion of spenn into egg. Their
praise of materialist lust appropriately echoesMulligan's praise of beasts: "Whereat
Crotthers of Alba Longa sang youngMalachi's praise of that beast the unicorn how once in a
millennium he cometh by his horn" (U 14.233-4).
So if intercourse can be understood in a materialist sense as less a marital sharing in
non-material, pre-existent love than as a strictlyphysical act, nothing remains in a universal
natural sense to distinguish marital intercourse from non-marital intercourse (wife from
maid). All we have left is the material action; no reality beyond the material action remains
to grant it meaning any different from any other material action. And we see this materialist
view of sex during Ulvsses. Certainly, besides the medicals, the clearest example of sexual
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intercourse as sheer brute action isBoylan. Heviews awoman notas a source of revelation,
as the non-materialist Stephen seems toelsewhere, but as " ayoung pullet" (U 10.327).
Molly comments on Boylan:
... I didnt like hisslapping mebehind ... Imnota horse or anass am I... [H]e
never goes tochurch mass ormeeting he says your soul you have no soul inside only
grey matter because he doesnt know what it is tohave one yes when I lit the lamp
because he must have come 3 or 4 times with that tremendous big red brute of a thing
hehas ... like a Stallion driving it up into you because thats all they want outof you
with that determinedvicious look in his eye ... not satisfied till they have us swollen
out like elephants .... (U 18.122-166)
Here Molly raises possibilities for a materialist reading ofUlysses. If we insist that
Ulysses argues for amaterialist view oflove (love isjustamaterial action ofpleasure and/or
preservation), then we can see this possibility in the above passage. Boylan certainly does see
Molly asa beast, a horse or an ass, and asfar asheis concerned, if a woman is a beast, she
certainly hasnosoul. Without thisnon-material reality, then, intercourse forBoylan is no
more Aan acting as a stallion, a beast.
Theanimal imagery throughout theabove passage indicates thematerialist nature of
Mulligan's view aswell. AsMulligan says, "To meit's all a mockery and beastly Look at
the sea. What does it care about offences? Chuck Loyola, Kinch, and come on down. The
Sassenachwants his morning rashers" (U 1.210-231). In this world, there is no Jesuit
spirituality, noworld infused with a spirit of love as A.E. would have us view thematerial
world; "[T]he earth is not an exploitable ground but the livingmother" (U 9.106-7). Instead,
like the Homeric mother-sea, "our great sweet mother" (U 1.80),we are reduced to a
collection of atoms, of sea-water, except we eat food, too.
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Any appeal to a love beyond our immediate material experience would have to.be met
by the materialist with scoffing, orat least skepticism. Whereas the non-materialist would
view sentimentalism as a misunderstanding of love's true nature, its true definition, the
materialist would view anybelief in loveasnon-material and pre-existent as sentimentalism.
We never have a heart which hears the call to resurrection; all we have is the heart as a pump.
Anything more can only be regarded as, anexample ofGerty's heartfelt "pitapat" (U13.411),
or as her "ministering angel toowith a littleheart worth its weight in gold" (U 13.325). And
Molly's spirituality could be considered as a type of superstition when shesays, "[T]he candle
I lit that evening inWhitefriars streetchapel for themonth ofMaysee it brought its luck,
though hed scoff if he heard" (U 18.139-40).
Butperhaps these twoviews donot satisfy the reader; perhaps dissatisfaction with the
first viable reading of love as immaterial (Fox's "enfleshed love") or the second of love as
material (Mulligan's 'beastliness'), leaves the reader seekinga third viablealternative. The
most attractive alternative I've found is Richard Ellmann's love as a combination of material
body and non-material soul/mind. He comments regarding Molly that "[s]heprovesby her
discrimination that love is a blend of mind and body" (xiv). He later claims, "[Lovejcan
claim to be all soul or all body, when only in the union of both can it truly exist" (xiv).
Ellmann's idea here seems very similar to one ofW.Y. Tyndall's notions.W.Y. Tyndall
claimed during the fifties that Bloom constituted a synthesis, a union, of the body as
representedbyMolly and the soul/mindas represented by Stephen(120). Though in
Ellmann's version, Molly constitutes this union, I find Tyndall's version more tenable. Thus
in demonstrating the viabilityof this third equally viablereading, I will argue at length that
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love can be best understood in Ulysses as a union of the material and non-material: Molly
representing the material, Stephen representing the nonmaterial, and Bloom representing the
union of the two.
First,we can useMolly as amodel for thematerial world thatmust be united with the
immaterial worldfor love to exist.Molly conveys a basicdislike for immaterial realities such
as ideas (which Bloomclaims are a typeof soul, a typeof immateriality [U 16.748-752])
while emphasizing hergreatappetite forbodily, material sex. Shecomplains about Bloom's
intellectualizations: "I asked him about... that word met something with hoses in it and he
came outwith somejawbreakers aboutthe incarnation he nevercan explain a thing simply
thewaya bodycan understand" (U 18.565-67). Again, I think theword 'body' here is of great
importance because, by emphasis, Molly ismore of amaterial body than sheis someone with
a body and an intangible soul in balance. Evenwhen she concedes that, to win Stephen, she
will have to "learn a bit... so he won't thinkme stupid", she does it so that she may "teach
him the other part HI make him feel all over him till he faints under me" (U 18.1363-4). In
this way,Molly pictures herself rightingher nonmaterialist inadequacies only in a superficial
way so that she might better be able to seduceStephen (who seems to be lacking in
materiality, but that's a consideration for later). So even here,Molly recognizes that her
emphasis is on the material body, not the immaterial world.
But Molly can be consideredprimarily a materialist for more reasons thanjust her
distaste for the immaterial mind. In addition to her dislike for ideas, we can also see how
Molly's sexual intercourse concerns itself withonly thematerial and not nonmaterial love
(Hayman 108).As consideredpreviously, her sexual intercourse withBoylan,with all its
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bestial imagery (ass, horse, Stallion, elephant), very much falls short ofany considerations of
an immaterial love.
And because ofMolly's obvious preference for the material world almost to theentire
exclusion of the nonmaterial world, I don't find her to be the figure of unitive love which
Ellmann sees her as. He claims that she's the unitivefigure of love since she concretely acts
out love:
Finally, in the last episode of the book, Molly Bloom, aftersome equivocation
between her physical longing forBoylan andher thoughts of Bloom, comes down
firmly on the sideofBloom and of their oldfeelings for each other. Sheproves by
her discrimination that love is a blend of mind and body. ... [H]er memories
culniinatein a practical a practical demonstration of the nature of lovewhich bears out
what Stephen andBloomhave saidmore abstractly, (xiii-xiv)
As I've said, I don't seeMolly thisway. Firstof all, I'm not too surea unitive reading of love
inUlvsses demonstrates thatMolly "comes down firmly on the side ofBloom". Certainly,
Ulysses ceases to recordMolly'smemorywithher saying "Yes" toBloom on the Howth. But
this doesn't necessarily mean that she is saying "Yes" to Bloom for tomorrow and forever.
We don't know, for instance, if she's re^ly going to make him his eggs (the symbol of rebirth
for theirmarriage perhaps?), or if she'lleven stop her affairwith Boylan. The ambivalence of
Molly toward Bloomevenoccurs in thememory which Ellmann cites asMolly's definitive
"yes" to Bloom: she claims, regarding Bloom's kiss on theHowth,"... I thought well aswell
him as another" (U 18.1604-5). Not only is Molly indifferent in this passage, but we don't
even know if the person she is saying "Yes" to is Bloom, orMulvey under theMoorish wall.
Furthermore, Molly's "Yes" is balanced by several No'sthroughout the last chapter. In this
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way, then, Molly's memories leave herattitude toward Bloom inconclusive atworst,
suggestive at best.
And Ellmann's claim that her memories end "in a practical demonstration of the
nature of love which bears outwhat Stephen and Bloom have saidmore abstractly" canbe
seriously questioned in a unitive reading of love. Ameniory doesn't seem toconstitute a
practical demonstration. If anything, it indicates that Molly's days ofloving Bloom are either
in the past, or in a future to which we as readers do nothave access. A practical
demonstration would seem to demand an action in the here and now. And later we will see
thatBloom, as the unity of body and soul/mind (thematerial andnonmaterial) indeed
demonstrates a practical action of love within Ulysses which canhardly be considered
abstract.
Understanding Molly as primarily a materialist, though, implies that she has some
inclinations to beliefs in the nonmaterial. Molly's marginal desire for nonmaterial realities,
then, sets her off from extreme materialists such as Boylan and Mulligan, thus indicating a
desire for union with the nonmaterial world that involves love. As mentioned before, she
hardly finds Boylan's disapproval of the soul's existence credible. Andsheevenhas an
abstract understanding of love as a typeof sacrifice, a way through which a non-materialist
may argue that love enters the world:
• [I]t must be real love if a man gives up his life for her that way for nothing I suppose
there are a few men like that left its hard to believe in it though unless it really
happened tome themajority of them with nota particle of love in theirnatures to find
twopeople like that nowadays full up of each other. (U 18.1056-1060)
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Notice, though, thatMollyprimarily describes even this notion of love primarily in
spatial/material terms: particle, full up. Buteven with these notions of love, Molly, as
arguedabove, still finds herself primarily interested in a nonmaterialism which constitutes
more a typeof superstition (the lucky candle inWhitefriars chapel, for instance) than it does
a divine reality independentof our personalwhims. In this way, though, she demonstrates
that she is the other half, the material half, with which Stephen, being the nonmaterial half,
needs to become acquainted so that he may become a Bloom.
AsMolly's counterpart,Stephencan be understood as the nonmaterial half of unitive
love. Like Molly, Stephen, too, has an emphasis in his experience of the world. He primarily
experiences the world in nonmaterial terms (ideas of Catholic theology, for instance). And
again like Molly, Stephen avoids an extreme (in this case, the extreme of Gerty's sentimental
spiritualism) that would entirely exclude him from ever achieving unitive love. Stephen
appears to vacillate between an extreme point of view denying the reality of the material
world, and a more wary confrontation with questions regarding the relationship between the
material and intangible worlds. At one point, Stephen displays his allegiance to the former
point of view when he wonders if "[t]he soul is in a manner all that is" (U 2.75) during his
ruminations on what is real in the world. He later walks on the beach during "Proteus"
considering Berkeley's and Aristotle's thoughts concerning the reality of the material world,
going so far as to speculate whether or not the material world ceases to exist when he closes
his eyes, whether or not it exists as anything outside of his nonmaterial mind (U 3.25-29).
Unlike the materialist, Stephen seems much more willing to question the existence of the
material world than the spiritual world.
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And death for Stephen, far from being a reduced materiahst experience ofbeastly
brain death, means dealing with his mother's soul, who comes back to him from the grave in
a drunken vision during "Circe": "THE MOTHER (wrings her hands slowly, moaning
desperately) OSacred/ Heart ofJesus, have mercy on him! Save him from hell,/ ODivine
Sacred Heart!" (U 15.4231-3). Somereaders may be skeptical and think this is just an
alcohol-induced illusion onStephen's part, but it's never made totally clear whether it was
merely Stephen's mind orwhether a ghost actually did appear to Stephen. This answer
would depend a great deal onhowreader reads Ulvsses: as a materialist novel, or as a
nonmaterialist novel. In a spiritualist, nonmaterialist sense, a ghosthere couldcarry on a
very real life of its own, quite unlike Mulligans' dead tripes.
ButStephen is obsessed with a nonmaterial reality even more significant tohim than
death. Andthat reality is love. Risking another extreme spiritualist position, Stephen
wonders at onepoint, "Wasthat then real? The only true thing in life [amother's love]?" (U
2.143) The problem for Stephen, though, isknowing whether ornotheeven knows what
love is. Atonepointhe simply asks himself, "Doyou know what youare talking about?
Love, yes" (U 9.429).
I have to seriously question Stephen's response to himself, however. Forhere in a
unitive vision of love, the spiritualist/nonmaterialist meet the dilemma of thematerialist:
love demandsboth,abody and a.soul. In Stephen, we see someonewho has plenty of
nonmaterial soul/intellect, but a great reluctance to admit the body as a way of knowing love.
Concerning love, rather than speaking from any type of experiential knowledge (asMolly
says above when she claims thatshewould know love if it happened to her), Stephen can
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only speak from his "mental organs" (U 16.788) ashe does concerning the soul and the
material world when speaking withBloom in thediner. Stephen has heavily relied onhis
intellect to understand his world, including such immaterial realities such as love. This
intellect proceeds carefully and exactly "syllogistically from theknown to theunknown" (U
17.1012-3), In its exactness, his intellect has trapped Stephen in his own mind, wanting
human intimacy, love. And rather than bringinghim to this intimacy,his intellect has
become an instrument of separation, "dagger definitions" (U 9.84).
The greatest evidence of Stephen's trappedness, of hismaterially-lacking intellectual
knowledge of love, is manifested in his intense physical longing for a woman.When
discussing Shakespeare in the library, Stephen raises the issue of the seduction of
Shakespeareby AnneHathway, Stephenwonders, "Andmy turn? When?" (U 9.261). His
lonely musings continue when he spots a book for sale and reads some of it: "How to win a
woman's love. For me this" (U 10.847). As long as Stephen's world includes only the
nonmaterial soul and ideas, Stephen will be left alone with his mind, separated from that
body so necessary for love.
Despite his reluctance to leave his world of nonmaterial ideas, Stephen, as he does
while walking on the beach, still investigates the relationshipbetween the material and
nonmaterial worlds. Stephen recognizes this precarious relationship when he defines God as
a "shout in the street" (U 2.386). And despite his philosophical queries regarding the
material world, Stephen, being the nonmaterialist that he is, can "scarcely distinguish an acid
from an alkali" (U 14.1296-7). Stephen, then, would seem to have at least a passing
familiarity with the material bodily world much as Molly does with the nonmaterialist
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spiritual/intellectual world. In this sense, then, wecantake Stephen not as an extreme
nonmaterialist, but as someone struggling to understandthis relationship between the
material and nonmaterial.
^With these two viewof reality inmind, thematerial and the nonmaterial, Molly
representing the material and Stephen as representing the nonmaterial, we can more clearly
see that (to useEllmann's words in a way that he didn'texactly use them) "love is a blendof
mind andbody" (xiv). Though this combination bynomeans makes a human being perfect,
it allows love to exist in its fullest form: in the material realm and in the nonmaterial realm.
We see this combination most clearly in Leopold Bloom. Though BloOm himself doesn't
seemto realize it, he displays love as a trueunion of both thematerial and the nonmaterial, a
unionwhich characters like StephenandMolly cut themselves off from in their emphasis of
one aspect over the other.
Bloom displays a layman's passion for the material world throughout the novel. At
various points in the day, he tries to apply his scientific knowledge (the rate of falling bodies
for instance [U 15.2781]) to physical phenomena he encounters. Scientifically grounded in
the material world as he is. Bloom firmly believes that [ejvery phenomenon has a natural
cause" (U 15.2795-6) whether it's the thunder or, as it is in this case, a prostitute making him
submit to her. He wonders elsewhere if "[b]lack conducts, reflects, (refracts, is it?), the heat"
(U 4.79-80). He dreams up inventions "to stop that" hard childbirthing (U 8.377-8). And he
comments on the fact that cells, the building blocks of material life, live "for ever practically"
(8.781).
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Bloom's familiarity with thematerial world, however, has not made him callous, as it
has Blazes Boylan, to the nonmaterial qualities ofthe world, women in particular. Though,
likeBoylan (Bloom's notperfect), heogles women, aswhen he tries to get a view of a
woman's stocking as sheboards a tram (U5.98), Bloom still recognizes at othertimes that a
woman is more thanjust a pullet. ForBloom, a woman's (Molly's) "bedwarmed flesh"
represents "[l]ife, life" (U4.238-9). Moreover, according toMolly herself. Bloom can
appreciate a woman's intangible qualities because hecanunderstand andfeel "what a woman
is" (U 18.1579). Quite unlike Boylan the strict materialist, then, Bloom is capable of
understanding the nonmaterial qualities of a woman.
Bloom's understanding of the material world goes beyond his intangible
understanding of women, ofMolly's world, and intothe nonmaterial/spiritual world of ideas,
of Stephen'sworld.Both Stephen andBloomconsider the idea of metempsychosis
throughout the day. While walking on the beach, Stephenwonders, "God becomes man
becomes fish becomes barnacle goose becomes featherbedmountain" (U 3.477-8). Bloom,
of course, spendspart of his morningattempting to explain "Methim what?" to Molly (U
4.336).
But Bloom and Stephen are not mere clones. For instance, they both think about the
nonmaterial afterlife. Whereas Stephen experiences his mother's ghost, Bloom holds that,
though the Resurrection may warmMr. Keman'sheart, "Once you are dead you are dead" (U
6.677).
Though this comment seems to echoMulligan at the tower, thus betrayingBloomas a
materialist, this does not mean that Bloom holds no place for a nonmaterial essence to human
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beings. As he laterexplains, what Stephen calls the soul. Bloom calls the intelligence, thus
reinforcingEllmann's assessmentof themind and the soul as parts of the same
nonmateriality:
You as a good Catholic, he observed, talkingof body and soul, believe in the soul. Or
do youmean the intelligence, the brainpower as such, as distinct from any outside
object, the table let us say, that cup. I believe in that myself. (U 16.748-51)
Thus does Bloom stake his belief in the nonmaterial world, but in the strictly secular
nonmaterial world of the mind.
This inteUigence is another way in whichBloom and Stephen, though similar in that
they both partake of the nonmaterial world, are very different. Whereas Stephen's
intelligence traps him, paralyzes him, prevents him from loving, Bloom has learned in what
situations his intelligence is useful and when it is an obstacle. For situations of explaining
material phenomena, Bloom uses his intelligence well. One instance of Bloom's intellectual
prudence occurs when he explains how thunder works to a terrified Stephen during "Oxen of
the Sun." Stephen hears the thunder and fears that God is speaking in his thunder,
disapproving of Stephen's humorous blasphemy. Whereas Stephen quakes, Bloom explains
that the thunder was not the sign of God's wrath , but the "discharge of fluid from the
thunderhead, look you, having taken place, and all of the order of a natural phenomenon" (U
14.426-8). Unlike Bloom, then, Stephen has yet to leam the boundaries of the intellect
concerning an explanation of the nonmaterial.
When intellectual prudence such as Bloom's is not followed, farces such as Dignam's
seance result. Here, rather than a union of the material and nonmaterial, the two are
mistakenly exchanged, one falsely imposed on the other, in this case, the material upon the
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nonmaterial. We see this through the spatial terms used to describe the nonmaterial;
"whereabouts," region," "directed to the proper quarter," "sensations," and "divide" (U
12.337-73). Bloomhimself comments, "[I]t is one thing to invent... a farreaching natural
phenomenon such aselectricity butit's a horse ofquite another colour to say you believe in
the existence of a supernatural God" (U 16.766-771).
And, in a reading which views love as union between the material and the
nonmaterial, the realization of this line between the material and nonmaterial worlds enables
Bloom to love. Unlike Stephenwho is trapped in his own mindby his "daggerdefinitions",
Bloom has no definitions to offer of this most important nonmaterial phenomenon: love.
Upon getting into an argument with an angry citizen atBarney Kieman's pub concerning
violence in Irish history, Bloom responds:
- But it's no use ... Force, hatred, history, all that. That's not what's life for men and
women, insult and hatred. And everybody knows that it's the very opposite of that
that is really life.
- What? says Alf.
-Love, says Bloom. I mean the opposite of hatred. (U 12.1481-5)
In this one passage, Bloom demonstrates the reality of the intangible by showing it to be
beyond rational thought; with our intellect, we can only hint at love, fumble over inadequate
definitions and slipping words. Having been taught in the "University of Life" (U 15.840),
Bloom, "more experienced" (U 16.777) than Stephen, speaks and loves from that experience.
Thus, despite his foibles and shortcomings, it is Bloom who, unlike any other
character, performs an actual act of kindness which, with his thoughts and words, create an
act of love, an act which creates love by using both the soul/mind and the body in one act.
Unlike Molly, Gerty^ or Stephen, who reminisce or fantasize about love. Bloom acts. When
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he rescues Stephen from the brothel district, physically picking him up from the gutter in a
Samaritan-esque action, Bloomwills Stephen's good.
And, if wetrustThomas Aquinas, this willing Stephen's good is an act of thehighest
form of love. As Gifford points out, during the "Scylla and Chrarybdis" episode, Stephen's
quote ofAquinas ("Amor vero aliquid alicui bonum vult unde eteaquae concupiscimus" [U
9.430-1]) concerns Aquinas' distinction "between 'True love [which] requires one towill
another's good' and selflove, which wills another's good primarily asconducive to one's own
good" (Gifford 221). Rather than being infused from ahigher, nonmaterial source, then.
Bloom's act demonstrates that love comes into existence through a life which recognizes both
the nonmaterial and material worlds as co-existent. Otherwise, Bloom's action would be no
more an act of love than Mulligan's savingof the drowned man (whoseharm or death,
presumably, would be nothing but a beastly end according toMulligan).
By willing Stephen's goodinmind andbody, then. Bloom hasmadean act of love, an
act of connection which so many of the characters in their own frustrated ways have tried to
achieve: Molly in her reminiscing of herold lovewithBloom, andStephen in his desire to
be touched: "Touch me. Soft eyes. Soft soft soft hand. I am lonely here. O, touch me soon,
now. What is the word known to all men? I am quite here alone. Sad too. Touch, touch
me" (U 3.434-6).
The key, then, to an authentic love similarto whatEllmann andTyndall call for
would seem to be not materialism, nor a nonmaterialist spiritualism/idealism, but a love
which embraces both the material and the nonmaterial as a co-existent One. In this view,
then, James Joyce teaches us this meaning of love.
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After such an extended discussion of the threeprimaryways in which love in Ulysses
canbe viewed, wecan see that they all involve viable takes on the issue, each reading having
itsparticular merits. Thus, here is where wegoto the next step ofFish's method: rather than
solving this dilemma offinding the exact nature/definition oflove as it ispromulgated
through Ulvsses. wecanmake this formal ambiguity signify within an established
expectation. As we learned from Fish how Milton's sonnet establishes an expectation that the
nature of delights will be resolved, wehave seen thatUlvsses establishes an expectation of its
own: the nature of love will be determined. With Fish's method in mind, rather than
perpetuating endless formalist readings, let us assign a significance to this ambiguous
formalist debate over love in Ulvsses within the context of the expectation of determining
love's nature.
Just as in Milton's sonnet "everything in the line before 'spare' creates the expectation
of an imminentjudgment... and transfers the pressure of judgment to us" (Fish 1242), much
in the same way does Ulvsses present the nature of love regarding its materiality and its
nonmateriality. Ulvsses doesn't so much offer a prescriptive answer to how we ought to view
this dilemma as much as it points out that we must consider the issue and decide for
ourselves. Rather than offering us clear cut definitions of love, we get Aquinas' mangled
definition from Stephen, and a word known to all men which is never explicitly stated. As
Bloom has sent Stephen, then, so too are we sent into the inexact, unsure night by a
catechism-avoiding teacher. We don't know exactly how the material and nonmaterial
interact in love, but it's up to us to somehow be open to the issue now that we're aware of it.
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The key to doing so, as this reading experience ofUlvsses seems to indicate, then, is
not so much to define the nature of love in Ulvsses as much as it is to recognize its centrality
to the book and, thus, to our lives. Bloom throughout the day is obsessed with his crunibling
life withMolly,most particularly in their inability to consummate the physical act of sexual
intercourse, and their growingnonmaterial emotional distancefrom each other. Stephen
cannot shakehis need for physical and emotional intimacy — this need disruptinghis
intellectual thoughts seemingly at will even during the heatedShakespeare argument. Mina
Purefoy, Gerty, Simon Dedalus and his daughters, all are in some way concerned with love,
with intimacy and what to do about it concerning their bodies' well-being and their spiritual
well-being.
This centrality of love and its material/nonmaterial dilemma points out that how we
love depends a great deal on how we understand this dilemma. In other words, how we
resolve the material/nonmaterial dilemma goes a long way in shaping how we treat ourselves
and others. Most criticism on love in Ulvsses usually seems to resolve this issue by claiming
that love is either a material, nonmaterial, or material/nonmaterial phenomenon. In reality, it
seems, all three could very possibly be present in Ulvsses. In the face of this possibility, we
can only really observe how character's actions formulate a certain understanding of love.
When someone understands love as a material phenomenon, they seem to act as does
Mulligan and Boylan, or even, perhaps mothers and Bloom. When someone understands
love as a nonmaterial phenomenon, they seem to act as does Gerty by fantasizing and,
possibly, Stephen in his intellectualizing, and, possibly, various church members such as Fr.
Conmee, in his theologizing and belief in a pre-existent God Who is Love. In the case of
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someone who views love as a union of material and the nonmaterial, they may act as Bloom
does: many intellectual thoughts, butalso material action aswhen hehelps Stephen.
But in trying to understand thenature of thematerial andthenonmaterial in love in
Ulvsses, we come across another issue which also doesn't seem to be resolved in Ulysses but
bears greatly upon love inUlvsses: thevery question of 'what is real?' Particularly in the
ModemandPostmodern worlds, this question becomes striking. In a worldof continued
technological growth (such as theprinting presses of 'Aeolus'), where do older beliefs in a
nonmaterial God go? If atoms are seen as 'real' and 'ghosts' suchGod as unreal, what does
thatmean for love, supposedly thevery essence ofGod? Aswith Mulligan's reduction of the
mystical Catholic Eucharist to a Frankenstein-esque electrical show, does love, too, fall under
the scientific sway?
And in attempting to answer such questions, we see howUlvssesproblematizes even
our attempts to Understand the questions, let aloneformulate answers. As we see in our
formalist efforts to define love in Ulvsses. the temptation to make what we see into the only
visionpossible remains strong. Just as various characters attemptto restrict Bloom, for
instance, (Lenehan's "Bloom has a bit of the artist in him", or Molly's insistence that he
doesn't, though he does knowwhat a woman feels), somay we attempt to restrict love. It's
only material, or it's only nonmaterial, or it's a union of the two, or even some other
conclusion: all these conclusions potentially create that same catechistic parody from which
Ulvsses warns us. By showing us how many characters (as in the above example) can view
the same character (the same object, the same phenomenon) in mutually exclusive ways,
Ulvsses makes it even more difficult for us to say conclusively, "This is the nature of love."
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But the nature of love involves more than its materiality/nonmateriality. As critics
have pointed out, we can even ask if love is a positive and/or negative force. As with the
question of love's materiality/nonmateriality, perhaps Fish's method of making making
mutually exclusive viable readings signify rather than stretch endlessly toward formalist
closure can again be of help. "
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CHAPTER 4. LOVE AS POSITIVE/NEGATIVE
What has been mentioned thus far of Ulvsses has focused on the uncertainty in
Ulvsses, its ambiguity. And this ambiguity has not only stemmedfrom the critical realm,
reaching from Kenner's vision ofUlvsses as thegreat negation toEllmann's vision ofUlvsses
as affirming the essential goodness of humanity, but it has alsobeen seen in the characters
own ruminations. Various characters wander through the day considering good and bad
events, personal andhistorical. Perhaps themost famous vacillation between negation and
condemnation occurs in the final chapter, wherein Molly vacillates between "no" and "yes"
throughout the chapter.
So when these critics read these characters, perhaps it should come as no surprise that
such vacillation occurs in the discussion of several issues in Ulvsses. And, of course, this
vacillation would include love in Ulvsses as well. Critical opinion runs from the vision of
love in Ulvsses as being an entirely positive phenomenon (however it may be constituted as
material and/or nonmaterial) to love being a phenomenon both positive and negative.
We can see the vision of love in Ulvsses as being a positive phenomenon most clearly
in the criticism of Richard Ellmann, particularly in his introduction to the Gabler edition of
Ulvsses. Here Ellmann cites Stephen's reveries about Aquinas during "Scylla and Charybdis;
'Do you know what you are talking about? Love, yes. Word known to all men. Amor
vero aliquid alicui bonum vult unde et ea quae concupiscimus...' The Latin conjoins
two phrases in Thomas Aquinas's Summa contra gentiles. Aquinas is distinguishing
between love, which as he says in the first six words, 'genuinely wishes another's
good,' and, in the next five, a selfish desire to secure our own pleasure 'on account of
which we desire these things,' meaning lovelessly and for our own good, not
another's, (xii)
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Even though KJmball may becorrect in her claim that Ellmann misunderstands the butchered
Aquinas fragments here, what's important about Ellmann's statement is not so much how he
understands Aquinas, but the definition of lovewhich he creates. Love, here, forEllmann is
a type of agape, the selfless willing of another's good. And against this love Ellmann sets
brutality, hatred, andselfishness, because, according to him, "[t]he nature of love has to be
more intimatelyanatomized, subjectedto attacks of various kinds" so that we maybetter
understand the different between authentic love and those false pretenders to the throne.
Ellmann's definition of love as being an entirely positive phenomenon receives
support from another Joycean even as he tries to refuteEllmannin Ellmann's claim that love
is the word known to all men. Responding to Ellmann's claim that love is the word known to
all men, Boyle states that he himself sees Joyce as "unwilling to exclude the opposite of love
in his coal-hole vision" (in Benstock 143). And since love "does exclude a great deal — all
negative, perhaps," it can't possibly be the word known to all men.
And it is in Boyle's recognition that Joyce would be unwilling to exclude the opposite
of love in his vision that leads us to consider another critic who examines love in Ulysses,
Cheryl Fox. Fox's definition would eliminate this problem of Boyle's and Ellmann's since
love in this definition does indeed include much that is negative. Fox discusses love's
"imprecision", and its ability to "entail the subjugation and therefore the partial negation of
the one loved;" love's ability to both affirm and negate are mutually exclusive capabilities and
irreconcilable (800).
71
Andin understanding thisdiscussion, weunderstand the issues. Is loveonly positive?
Is it both positive and negative? And in both cases, how so? InEllmann's terms, how do we
"anatomize" love in both cases so that we may understand it?
Aswith theprevious discussions concerning knowledge inUlysses and the
constitution of love (material and/ornonmaterial), I will show that these above discussions of
love could benefit from a reading pattemedafter themethodof Stanley Fish: read for
signification rather than formal closure. In other words, wewant to concern ourselves with
what it means that these issues get discussed rather than focusing on determining whetheror
not love is really all positive or positive/negative.
In doing so, I will demonstrate how the two above ways of reading the
positive/negative problemwith love in Ulvsses depend on a formalistmethodwhich
necessarily seeks closure. And in their demand for closure, these two above readings start
and finish with definitions which are not revisited recursively, thus shutting themselves off
from the play of ambiguity withinwhichUlvsses revels andwhich it demands of the reader.
But first we must examine the Ellmann/Boyle position of love as positive, and then
the Fox position of love as positive/negative. Thus will I show how both these readings
make use of the formalist method (which Fish describes as being capable of proving
everything and anything) on similar formalist features. Having established the equal
formalist viability of both readings, I can then proceed to make this unresolvable problem
signify.
I
First, we can offer the anatomy of Ellmann's love in Ulvsses as being all positive.
Ellmann begins with the definition of love as "'genuinely wish[ing] another's good'" (xii).
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This love, then, would not cause harm or any other type of negative effect. And love need not
just be onetypeof action. Instead, it can take several forms: "sexual, parental, filial,
brotherly, and by extension social" (xiv). We can see love'sutter positiveness clearlyfrom
the exampleswhichEllmann chooses to exemplify his definition of love. One such example
is Bloom's rescue of Stephen fromNighttown. Ellmannclaims that Bloom does so out of a
"comradely and paternal love" (xiii). Nowhere does Ellmann speculate as to whether or not
Bloom's motives may have been mixed, that perhaps Bloom rescued Stephen in a self-serving
way to fulfill his own need to be a father, as Bloom's hallucination of Rudy after the rescue
could indeed suggest. If there were any such motive, for Ellmann, it certainly wouldn't be a
part of love as he knows it.
And this insistence of Ellmann's on love's absolute incorruptibility extends to his
assessment of Molly and Leopold's marital affection for each other. He claims they "cherish
moments of affection from their lives together as crucial points from which to judge later
events" (xiii). Again, these "moments of affection" would seem to exclude Molly's affair
with Boylan or Bloom's affair with Martha Clifford or his dallyings with Gerty. Rather than
their love for each other involving both good and bad, both being responsible for helping and
hurting each other, Ellmann would seem to have it neatly divided: good actions and
affections which are loving over here, and, over there, the bad things that spouses do to each
other.
With this notion of love as incorruptible as a basis, I think it's safe to say what
Ellmann would assign as motherly love and what isn't. Certainly, Sargent's mother, saving
him from being crushed by the race of the world, would constitute love since she was willing
73
Sargent's good. But as for Stephen's mother, her ghost tormenting Stephen with "threats of
hellfire" (xiii), her actions cannot beconstrued as actions of love. Rather they arepartof
what Stephen "defies" in thename of the love which wills the good of the other (xiii).
Butthe question remains: if these actions by people who supposedly love you (Molly
and Bloom's mutual infidelity, Stephen's mother tohim. Bloom's possibly mixed motivations
for rescuing Stephen) aren't part of love, then what purpose do they serve? Ellmann answers
that question by saying, "The nature of love has tobemore intimately anatomized, subjected
to attacks of various kinds" (xiii). So when we see Bloom andMolly being unfaithful, it's so
we can better recognize their fidelity; Bloombeing selfish allowsus to better see his
selflessness; andMayDedalus' threats showus by contrast the deep love of a mother.
Two specific examples which Ellmann citesas beingparticularly helpful in
anatomizing love becomeuseful here: Mulligan andBoylan. Regarding "'Love's bitter
.mystery,Ellmann claims, "It is something that Buck Mulligan, though he is the first to
quote the poem, cannot understand, being himself the spirit that alwaysdenies. It is also
alien to the experience of the womanizer Blazes Boylan" (xiii). It would appear here that
Mulligan and Boylan's deep concern for themselves prevents them from willing another's
good. In Mulligan's case, for instance, perhaps it couldbe argued that, likeBloom, he, too, is
a savior since he saves a drowning man. But Mulligan does this deed for his own glory,
whereasBloom genuinely wants to help Stephen. In Boylan's case, he may wish another
personpleasure, thus appearingto wish someonegoodwill, when in realityhe onlywishes
this good (if at all) to the extent which it brings himself pleasure. Ultimately, then, whatever
good Mulligan and Boylan can wish for others ultimately only serves to glorify and satisfy
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themselves. ThusareMulligan andBoylan barred from the realmof loveas all-positive
giving of self for the good of the other.
But besides reading love as agape, utter giving, we could read lovemore as Fox does.
Here love, rather than beinga precise case of willing another's good, contains "imprecision;"
it has an "ability to entail the subjugation and therefore the partial negation of the one loved"
(800). So, whereas the above readingby Ellmann(andpresumably by Boyle as well)
constructs a love as all positive,Fox's readingwouldconstructa love both positive and
negative.
But Fox never gets around to explaining exactly what she means by "imprecision"
and or giving examplesof the "subjugation of the one loved." As withEllmann,Boyle, and
other critics who mention love, Fox doesn't see the need for a clear explication of her terms
regarding love. By "imprecision"I take her to mean that love unavoidably slides between the
positive and negative, perhaps becomingan indistinguishable mix of the two. By positive, I
mean love as giving, as willing, to one extent or another, the good of someone or something
else — the exaltation of the one loved. In that sense, then, this positive is still indeed
understood by Fox in Thomistic ternis. By negative, I take what Fox says: "the subjugation
and partial negation of the one loved." In other words, the negative aspect of love entails the
harm done (intentionally or unintentionally) to someone who is supposedly loved by the
person who is supposed to be doing the lovmg[ISUl]. In this sense, then, love for Fox
appears to be a mix of willing good to a desired someone/thing, as well as willing bad to a
desired someone/thing[ISU2]. Love can thus function for the loved one's good, or to gain
power over the loved one.
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We can understand love as the willing of good for others by looking at the above
comments regarding Ellmann and Boyle's reading oflove inUlysses. Here, then, because
sheoffers us noexaimples, wemust find examples which would support Fox's claim thatlove
canenactthe subjugation andpartial negation of theone loved. In doing so,we'd seehow
Fox's reading gainsviability andcontradicts Ellmann andBoyle's reading of love in Ulvsses
as a strictly positive, agape love.
On the individual level, we can find perhaps the most clear example of love's
subjugating andnegating abilities in Stephen's father, Simon andin hismother. May. In
Simon's case, his love for his children sets up a scenario which allows him to neglect them.
For instance, when his daughter, Dilly, confronts him outside the auction hall demanding
money for food, we can clearly see howdependent the childrenremainuponSimon. Simon
"nervously" gives her "two pennies" so that she can buy "a glass of milk for [herjself and a
bun or something" (U 10.700-07). They depend on Simon because of his expected fatherly
love for them. This fatherly love sets up the expectation that he will provide for them as the
other children indicate:
-What's in the pot? [Katey] asked.
-Shirts, Maggy said.
Boody cried angrily:
-Crickey, is there nothing for us to eat? ...
-[Katey pouring peasoup] A good job we have that much. Where's Dilly?
-Gone to meet father, Maggy said.
Boody, breaking big chunks of bread into the yellow soup, added:
-Our father who art not in heaven.
Maggy, pouring yellow soup in Katey's bowl, exclaimed:
-Boody! For shame! (U 10.271-293)
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In this way, not only does Simon's love for his children enable him to provide for his
children, to will their good, it also allows him to make them his subjects, to do bad things to
them.
But love can be both positive and negative in more cases than just that of a lazy,
neglectful father. Subjugation can also occur as a result of the most concentrated of efforts at
a child's well-being. In this case, May Dedalus serves as a good example. Her concern for
Stephen's soul leads her to teach him her beliefs in heaven and hell. We see this effect in
Stephen's harrowing vision of his mother during Circe, warning him about his hell-bound
soul:
Who saved you the night you jumped into the train at Dalkey with Paddy Lee? Who
had pity for you when you were sad among the strangers? Prayer is allpowerful.
Prayer for the suffering souls in the Ursuline manual and forty days' indulgence.
Repent, Stephen ... I pray for you in my other world.... Years and years I loved you,
O, my son, my firstborn, when you lay in my womb.... Repent! O, the fire of hell!..
. Beware God's hand! O Sacred Heart of Jesus, have mercy on him! Save him from
hell, O Divine Sacred Heart!... Have mercy on Stephen, Lord, for my sake!
Inexpressible was my anguish when expiring with love, grief and agony on Mount
Calvary. (U 15.4193-4240)
Obviously well-intentioned by love, the inculcation Stephen received from his mother
nevertheless leaves Stephen emotionally and intellectuallycrippled, even after her death. In
his shattering of the chandelier, we see Stephen make yet another attempt to free himself
from this subjugation bom of love.
And this type of well-intentioned love begetting subjugation in the one loved occurs
not just on the personal level with mother and father, but at the institutional level as well with
Church and State. Here, the contrast between Fox andEllmann could quitepossiblybecome
most acute. Whereas Ellmann sees both Bloom and Stephen affirming love against the threats
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of religion as embodied in Stephen's "mother's threatsof hellfire" and "the sadistic nun," and
against the State's brutalities of "violence and history in the form of the British soldiers"
(xiii), Fox could very well see both of these types of subjugation as a natural possibility
inherent in a love of "imprecision" which can "entail the subjugation and therefore the partial
negation of the one loved" (800).
We can see subjugation as a part of the Church's love for its people as represented in
Ulvsses if we first consider Fr. Conmee and then the effects which Catholicism has on the
inhabitants of Ulvsses' Dublin. Conmee, like May Dedalus, obviously has the best intentions
for the people of God entrusted to his care. He, in other words, wills their good. For
instance, he carefully considers the then unorthodox view that perhaps souls dying
unbaptized may still go to heaven (U 10.143-152). But even here, elements of the narrative
betray his love's subjugative capacity. Fr. Conmee is "honoured," nature "curtsey[s]" to him
as he passes; the narrator comments, "He was their [the students] rector: his reign was mild"
(U 10.180-8).
Though perhaps "reign" in the above citation could be construed as being benevolent,
the "reign" of the Catholic Church proves otherwise. As Bloom observes, the communicants
at Mass take the Eucharist as if it were a "[l]ollipop.... Not so lonely Blind faith. Safe
in the arms of kingdom come. Lulls all pain" (U 5.360-8). That this scene occurs during the
"Lotus Eaters," the producers of pleasure who seduce Odysseus and his men into living a life
of pleasure and sloth, is no accident. Here, the loving concern of the Catholic Church has
resulted, not in the freedom of the Resurrection as promised, but in the sleepy subjugation of
the childish and helpless in need of their sweets, their sedative lollipop Eucharist.
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But rather thandismissing theChurch as a mere opiate substitute for thehigher good
of the State,Ulvsses demonstrates how the State, too, acts subjugatively while attempting to
ensure its subject's well-being. This notion of the State's willing our good and thus
subjugating us canbe summed upparticularly well byEdward theSeventh's rhyme; "My
methods are new andarecausing surprise./To make theblind seeI throw dust in their eyes"
(U 15.4478-9). Theclearest exemplification of this type of "imprecise" love, then, would be
Stephen's encounter withPvt. Carroutside thebrothel. Stephen recognizes boththeChurch
andState as those who wouldwill our good, but who, in the process, subjugateus, whenhe
says, "But in here it is I must kill the priestand theking" (U 15.4436-7). Here,Carrdefends
theKing whowouldensure all his subject'swell-being: "I'll wring the neckof anyfucking
bastard says a word against my bleeding fucking king" (U 15.4642-44). But, ironically, to
enforce his notion of the king as a figure who wouldwill our good, Carr must make Stephen
heel to his power; symbolically, the Statemustbreak its subjects to show them howmuch it
loves them, how sincerely it wishes to will their good.
And lest we think that the solution to the tyranny of the Church and State be a refuge
called the intellect, as Stephen seems to believe when he resists his mother with the cry, "The
intellectual imagination!" or when he resists Pvt. Carr, "He provokes my intelligence," we
can also see how the intellectual's love for the world can act subjugatively. In this case,
Haines allows us an opportunity to examine. Haines, the intellectual, claiming to love
Ireland, its culture, its literature, enacts through this love the subjugation of this very same
culture. He would enslave it, "I intend to make a collection of your [Stephen's] sayings if
you will let me," buy it for himself, view it as an article which he can possess as he possesses
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"his newbought book" ofIrish lore (U 10.1060). Haines' role as subjugator ofIrish culture is
well exemplified by his identity as an English subject. And as an Englishman, like Carr,
Haines represents the subjugation of the Irish by a foreign agent, as this conversation with
Haines would indicate:
I am the servant of two rriasters, Stephen said, an English and an Italian I can
quite understand that, [Haines] said calmly. An Irishman must think like that, I
daresay. Wefeel inEngland that we have treated you rather unfairly. (U 1.638-649)
This reading of love in Ulysses as both positive andnegative couldpossibly account
for the confusionwhichmany characters experience regarding love during the novel.
Bloom's assessmentof SimonDedaluswouldbe a goodexampleof how love as positiveand
negative would explain a problem. When Bloom hears Simon Dedalus singing "Love's
Sweet Song," the narrator (touse the termloosely) comments thatBloomthinks the songis
"heardfrom a person wouldn't expectit in the least" (U 11.679) because, as Bloom later
thinks, Dedalus "[w]ore out his wife [with child-bearing and his alcoholism]: now sings" (U
11.696-7). What Bloom seems to have difficulty understanding here is how someone who
treatedhis wife so poorly could appear, to so feelingly understand true love and express it in
art. PerhapsBloom is operatingunderBllmann's assumption that love is all good. If that's
the case, then Bloom wouldn't see how Simon's love for his wife had created his subjugation
of her as well. And in Simon's ability to wear his wife out in his love for her, love's
confusing "imprecision" makes itself known with a vengeance.
The problemwith both of these readings, though, and what gives birth to their equally
valid readings, is that they both begin with a definition of love in mind and carry it
throughout the novel, denying it any of the recursivity or instability which a center such as a
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definition would seem to have in Ulvsses. In this case, again, Fish proves useful. Because
rather than attempting to resolve a formalist issue which seems without conclusion (a
conclusion which, in fact, Ulvsses seems to do its best to thwart in so many ways), we can
instead usethe reader's experience tomake this conflict into a sign. Sowhat, then, do these
readings signify abouta reader's experience while reading Ulvsses?
First of all, and as it seems for so much of the experience of reading Ulvsses, love
proves tobevery confusing. Questions arise such ashow much can someone hurt you and
stillbe thought of as loving you, or, conversely, how much canyou hurt someone and still be
considered to love them? We see this dilemma particularly in Simon's treatment of his
children. Our view of whether or not Simon loves his children certainly takes shape
depending on ourview as to how love is actually enacted towards another's well-being.
Our view of love in this respect, as it does for Bloom in his thoughts of Simon,
greatly shape howwe thinkof otherpeople. Certainly, if love is whatEllmann andBoyle
claim it to be, an experiencestrictly of agape, then there isn't much roomfor compassion for
people likeSimon whowould seemto fail so miserably. But if love entails both thewilling
of good and the willing of bad, intentional or not, then the picturebecomesmore cloudy, and
perhaps demands more compassion.
But love extends past the ties between individuals. We have to question love as it
involves institutions and how they shape our abilities to act. Do these institutions paralyze us
in their actions of love? Do they enable us to act ourselves? Certainly to a great extent, the
State and the Church influence our abilities to love as Ellmann points out. But whether or
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notthey aremerely forces for evil asEllmann seems to claim or indeed havesome
benevolentmotives regardingour well-being remains a consideration.
And with this consideration in mind, we need to think about the role of will in love.
Perhaps, after all, love could quite possibly beawill tochoose good and/or bad. It is a choice
we continue to make in how we treat others and want to be treated.
But as the two above readings regarding the negativeness and positiveness of love
indicate, understanding love, its definition, its effects, its nature, is at best a difficult and
confusing experience, full of many possibilities, never really standing still longenough for us
to get a goodlook at it and say, "Aha! SoTHAT'S it!" Instead, we are left sitting with
Bloom, eating lunch, wondering at our immense capacity to harmandbe harmed by the very
same people we claim to love.
Whatever love is, of course.
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CHAPTERS. CONCLUSIONS
Considering the amount ofcritical effort expended upon Ulvsses. perhaps one could
suspect that any topic would beexhausted by now. For the most part, though, critics have not
extensively treated the topic of love in Ulvsses. Those few who have dealt with this topic
have done so rather briefly, using a formalist method. And in their investigations, these
critics haveexplored love through twomain avenues: one, they considered love as a
dilemma concerning the relationship between thematerial and thenonmaterial; two, they
considered love as a dilemma concerning whether or not lovewasa positive or negative
phenomenon.
Furthermore, in the above reading, we've seen how this sameformalist method can be
used to develop even more contradictory readings of these issues, readings which thecritics
themselves havenot yet considered. Concerning loveas amaterial and/ornon-material
phenomenon, using formalist methods, love can be viewed asbeing a solely spiritual
phenomenon, or a solely material phenomenon, or even as a combination of the two. When
reading love as a positive or negative phenomenon, we've seenhowformalism can lead us to
consider love as both all-positive or all-negative, depending on which definition of love we
choose to start with in our examination.
The problem, then, as Fish points out, is that this formalist method can't achieve the
closure it desires (1241). So, rather than endlessly seeking formalist closure, a more fruitful
way of examining an issue so resistant to formalism would be reader-response: "What, in
otherwords, if for the question "whatdoes 'spare' mean?" we substitute the question "what
does the fact that the meaning of 'spare' has always been an issue mean"?" (1241). Here, as
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Fish suggests,we can take these various conflicting reading responses to the topic (love) and,
rather than resolving them into one answer, make the critical disagreement itself into a sign
which has meaning (1240), in fact, several meanings, depending on how the readers consider
love as they read Ulvsses.
This study, therefore, was done to demonstrate how love in Ulvsses could be
understood as an opportunity for the reader's sign-making rather than as an issue subject to
the demands of formalist closure. Regarding the question of love's nature, Ulvsses
challenges us, not to find the answer in the book as if it were a type of Ithacan catechism, but
to create meaning, prompted by the various issues raised during the course of Ulvsses.
And what allows this meaning-making to occur is the very epistemology of Ulvsses.
one which denies conclusive certain knowledge in favor of recursive uncertain consideration
of various possibilities. Ulvsses itself, in fact, works to thwart formalist closure, valuing an
epistemology of uncertainty, open possibilities, and reader involvement in constructing
meaning. In other words, Ulvsses encourages the reader's production of multiple
possibilities, possibilities which Fish would have the readers make into a sign, possibilities
which formalism would whittle down to one final objective meaning to be found in the text,
not the reader. So, regarding Ulvsses. we can see that formalism, in allowing us to discern the
epistemology of recursivity which Ulvsses privileges, points us in the direction of a critical
methodology which seeks meaning, not only "in the text" but in the reader's response as well.
Ulvsses. therefore, doesn't begin with a set standard and then apply it to the worid,
nor does it take various samples and attempt to n^ow them into one monolithic universal
rule which would apply in any and all situations. Rather, in its complication of our notion of
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"the center" from which we leave and to which we return (and to which we respond), in its
complication of "the knowable object" and thus knowability itself, Ulvsses challenges us to
consider again and again the various "objects" with which we concern ourselves: love,
friendship, death, eternal life, etc. And Ulvsses does this, not so that it may offer us the
"answer" after we have looked hard enough and pieced together the pieces as a formalist
would, but so that we ourselves may take these modernist fragments and consider them, turn
them this way and that, view them from as many angles as possible, and discover what these
"objects" mean for ourselves, how we respond to them. Questions seem to be more Ulvsses-
business than do answers.
So what questions are being asked? And, judging from these questions, what sign is
being made? I don't think that a definitive answer to this question is possible, considering
that with every reader, there is a new reading, and, thus, new meaning, but we at least can
make a start with the samples given above. Ulvsses asks us, particularly in this modem
scientific age which challenges non-materialist notions such as "Providence" (Monk 6-7), to
consider love in light of the struggle between the material and the non-material. For instance,
does love exist as anything more than a material phenomenon? Is love now just a spiritualist
fantasy? Does it somehow exist in a union of the two?
Moreover, in light of darker understandings of humanity such as Freud's (Snead 146),
how do we understand love's nature Joyce's Ulvsses? Can we still see love as a strictly
positive reality? Or must we see love negatively, as producing the negation of that which is
loved even as it wills the loved object's well-being? These are just a few of the many
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questions which we must take as asign to interpret, as an opportunity to take responsibiUty
for ourselves and our answers.
Perhaps oneof the implications of this approach to love inUlysses is thatwemust
reconsider otherseemingly endless formalist discussions of othertopics inUlysses. For
instance, what of themanin themacinstosh? Who ishe? Why is he there? Whatdoes he
symbolize? Rather than thinking that the man in the macintosh offers us ameaning
explicable informalist terms, perhaps the man in the macintosh ismore important for the
responses which heelicits. Bythevery fact that formahst responses to theman in the
macintosh are seemingly endless, conclusionless (Cosgrove 681), themanin themacintosh
exemplifies what Ulysses in general demonstrates. The object ofstudy, thereferences, the
source which elicitsthe response, can never be fully known. Instead, the objectremains but a
vague dingy brownmacintosh, damp in muddy graveyard rain, subject to various responses
and formulations such as "M'Intosh." The man in the macintosh, like the responses, is a
vague sign to be readwhich neveroffers up definitive meaning and in fact canneverbe taken
to be the same; it must capable of being revisited over and over.
More broadlyregardingUlvsses. we can even revisit questions such as "Is Ulvsses an
affirmative or negative novel?"(in Ellmann, for instance), "Is it a novel of the deador of the
living?" (one ofKenner's questions), or even "What is themeaning of theHomeric parallels
inUlvsses?" (Spoo 179). In otherwords, wecan askwhat it means that we even raise these
issues, that we want to read Ulysses as a Homeric myth, that we want to read Ulysses as an
affirmingor negatingnovel. We can make these questions and their answers into signs
which have meaning.
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Beyondparticular considerations within Ulvsses. reader-response mightbe
particularly useful inunderstanding FinnesansWake. In light of the frustration which
formalist methodology has endured at the hands of theWake (Bishop 3, 26), perhaps it would
be useful to turn our attention to how readers respond. What formalist constructions do they
create? What particular issues do readers (critics) raise in theirresponses to Finnegans
Wake? And, as we did with love, what sign can we form from these readings and howwould
we read this sign? What is the meaning of this reading, of this sign?
And, more importantly I think, this approach reminds me of why we read. We read
because we enjoy creating meaning and we enjoy considering issues. What's most important
then is not so much the answers we make, but the questions we ask. And I think that it is
reader-response which most allows us to focus on this part of the novel. It allows us to
consider what people think, what it means that they think it, and the significance of these
thoughts.
With the above considerations in mind, it's easy to see that Ulvsses appeals to us
because it allows us the opportunity of responding to, of considering issues which we have
found particularly gripping. Before I decided to read Ulvsses through a reader-response lens, I
had thought to read Ulvsses as a structuralist/formalist. ExaminingUlvsses through a strictly
structuralist method caused me to re-examine how I thought about literature. I had mostly
thought of literature as something containing hidden meaning, a one-line answer to deep
questions. But the more I read Ulvsses using this formalist method, the more frustrated I
became. I couldn't find the one answer, and the more I read criticism, I realized that they
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couldn't either— that the point of literature wasn't somuchfinding an answer as much as it
was something else.
But what was that something else? Asking this question, we can realize that we enjoy
reading because of what it prompts us to think about. Notsomuch finding answers asmuch
asjust thinking about the answers and the questions. AndthemoreI thought of Joyce andof
structuralism, the more reductionist I considered finding one final authoritative strucmralist
response to Ulysses. Structuralism, therefore, especially when seenfrom the perspective of
reader-response, and considering the various structures forinedduringmy responseand the
responses of others, doesn't necessarily have to be reductionist.
As Fish points out, the only way we can respond to the book is in the terms we have
learned (1252), so being reader-response doesn't mean that we have abandoned structuralism.
It's just that now we can see our use of structuralism as a means to construct responses.
Using such structural tools as "type" and "category" (in this case, love as positive/negative,
or love as material/non-material), we can better understand the meanings which we construct
and what they signify, as well as understanding the constructs of others and what they signify.
We are also reminded by Charles Rossman that "[the text] is a product of the
interaction between the (never fully knowable) object-in-itself and the (fallible) mind of the
perceiver, a synthesis which is open to infinite correction and revision" (22). Thus, in paying
attention to how people have read love in Ulysses, to how we read love in Ulysses, to how
"[a]s is often the case in Ulvsses. two possible interpretations evolve from the evidence,
neither necessarily cancelling the other out" (Benstock Nature 50), and to how we miake signs
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out of these readings, we can truly come to better understand love in Ulvsses. an
understanding which is always a combination of the text and of us.
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